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Abstract
This thesis investigates the use of a free, open source UNIX-based operat-
ing system in providing security features to a financially sensitive business
function such as a treasury.
We start by examining some of the main security features (such as the
pf firewall and systrace policies) which are included with the operating sys-
tem, how they work and how such features can be used within a financial
environment. We then examine possible problems with each feature and
the introduction of such a feature into the business environment. We also
explore some of the criticism that OpenBSD has received and additional
features which could be useful to business.
We then look at some examples of statutory and regulatory require-
ments, and how OpenBSD’s features may be mapped to address such re-
quirements. As part of this we examine how open source software in general
can be utilised and some of the advantages and disadvantages of it against
similar commercial offerings.
We then see a case study based on a real-world treasury, and some of
the serious security concerns which are faced by security officers responsible
for such departments. We explore how OpenBSD can be applied within
an infrastructure to provide key security services and address some of the
specific concerns raised in the treasury security assessment.
Finally, we provide conclusions and suggestions for future work.
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Chapter 1
Executive Summary
This report aims to explore some of the security features of the OpenBSD
computer operating system and how those features can be utilised to secure
a Financially Sensitive Environment, such as a Treasury department for a
large international financials firm.
OpenBSD is a collection of software developed by computer security
enthusiasts in their spare time and made freely available (with all pro-
gram source code) to the worldwide community under a relaxed licence.
OpenBSD, like other computer operating systems such as Solaris, Windows
and HP-UX, is loaded onto computer hardware and acts as the base on which
business applications (for example, electronic funds transfer software) is run.
OpenBSD contains a number of security features not found in other operat-
ing systems, and this report seeks to show how those features can provide a
suitable level of security, whereby functionality can be tuned to an organi-
sation’s specific needs.
Financially Sensitive Environments (such as Treasuries and those dealing
with funds transfer) are often subject to numerous statutory and regulatory
compliance requirements (for example, PCI-DSS). Such requirements often
involve the need to demonstrate that systems are secure against attacks
on confidentiality, integrity and availability. OpenBSD’s security features
provide numerous benefits over other operating systems, by starting with a
minimal configuration which is added to as necessary, rather than defaulting
to activating all functionality which then requires systems administrators to
remove the parts which are not needed. Additionally, OpenBSD’s built-in
network and application controls allow the operating system to define fine-
grained controls over what business applications and users may do, increas-
ing confidence that systems are only performing actions which are explicitly
allowed by policy.
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OpenBSD is not without its own issues, and these are discussed in each
specific technology area. These issues raise the question about the overall
management of security in the enterprise, and how systems and technologies
are only one part of the security puzzle. The creation and maintenance of
suitable, cost-effective policies, procedures, processes, guidelines and stan-
dards should be undertaken in concert with proper risk management across
the enterprise, aligned with external obligations, business objectives and the
capabilities of the corporate assets - infrastructure, personnel and business
processes. OpenBSD can be used to increase the level of assurance in certain
environments, provided that the application of the technology is done in co-
operation with a security strategy which is driven by management support
and effectively communicated to staff.
9
Part I
Introduction
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Chapter 2
Introduction
2.1 Project Overview
This project is intended to show how the security features present within
the OpenBSD operating system can be utilised to enhance the security of
electronic data processing systems within a “Financially Sensitive Environ-
ment” (FSE) such as a corporate Treasury department. The project will
first of all explore some of the major security features of OpenBSD, how
they work, how they could apply to an FSE and any problems or challenges
associated with those controls.
The project will then explore the wider compliance issues surrounding
the application of security controls in such environments, including a discus-
sion of some of the major regulatory and statutory areas, and how OpenBSD
may help organisations deliver on their compliance responsibilities.
Following these background sections on technologies, issues and compli-
ance, the project will then utilise a real-world case study showing some of
the problems that an FSE may face, and how OpenBSD’s tools can be ap-
plied to enforce the security requirements. This case study is based on a
security assessment of a Treasury department within a large international
financials firm.
The project concludes with a summary of the analysed features and
how they can be aligned with the necessary control areas based on the in-
vestigations and recommendations which came out of the treasury security
assessment case study. It also looks at the future for OpenBSD.
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2.2 What is OpenBSD?
OpenBSD is a free, open-source, UNIX operating system which is driven
by code correctness and security [43]. Unlike commercial operating sys-
tems such as Microsoft Windows [37], OpenBSD is free of any per-system
or per-user licensing fees [39], and the source code to the operating system
is provided so that anyone may make changes to it as they see fit.
Cryptography forms a major part of the OpenBSD platform [41], and
the development team have included a number of tools to secure communi-
cations, including a full-featured IPSec implementation allowing OpenBSD
to act as an IPSec gateway to provide secure communications between sites
(tunnel), amongst other uses.
OpenBSD’s audited code base has a reputation amongst security circles
for having fixed many issues long before they become problematic in other
operating systems. An example of this is where the OpenBSD develop-
ers had changed the algorithm in their fork of ISC BIND code, avoiding a
recently published DNS cache poisoning attack [69].
2.3 What is a Financially Sensitive Environment?
A “Financially Sensitive Environment” (FSE) could be defined as one in
which the financial operations of a company are undertaken. This could
be accounting, treasury or an equivalent business function. It is not in-
tended to mean an environment where there are severe budget constraints
(i.e. price) however, as OpenBSD is free of licensing costs, this could well
be an additional benefit. For the purpose of this project, a financially sen-
sitive environment will be based on the concept of a Treasury department
for a large multinational corporation. Each organisation may organise their
accounting and financial control teams differently, but within the context of
this paper an FSE is the department (the people, processes and systems)
within the company that manages, reports upon and is responsible for cash
control.
A Financially Sensitive Environment could be argued to be more than
the direct controlling team over areas such as Accounts Receivable, Accounts
Payable, Travel and Entertainment Expenses and so on. In fact, the reports
generated by these teams are generally fed by data from outside their envi-
ronment (i.e. stock control, sales, subsidiary, and partner fiduciary systems)
so the dependency threshold could yet move back further to encompass sys-
tems and personnel feeding that data in to the primary target department.
However, this is issue of scope definition, and although there is some merit
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to envisaging the whole corporate entity as feeding into the financial data
being controlled by an FSE, this must be carefully considered. This is es-
pecially important when evaluating scope for certification against standards
such as ISO 27001, as certification is commonly undertaken against a well
defined area of the business [77], with clearly indentified inputs and outputs.
Failure to evaluate such scope properly can lead to unfeasibly large compli-
ance and certification projects, which may become prohibitively expensive
or ultimately unachieveable.
2.4 Project Objectives, Structure and Methodol-
ogy
One of the main objectives of this project is to demonstrate how the security
controls and concepts present within OpenBSD can be applied to financially-
sensitive environments to provide additional levels of assurance and extra
controls to ensure the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) of
systems within such an environment. Additionally, the project will seek to
explore the CIA augmentations, including Accountability, Authentication
and Non-Repudiation. Where necessary, additional third party open source
software packages will be introduced to contrast OpenBSD’s capabilities or
demonstrate additional control features not yet present within the base of
OpenBSD.
It is the intention that the demonstrated controls and techniques can
be applied to a financially sensitive environment so as to make a case for
the consideration of OpenBSD against other more commercially established,
closed source operating system platforms such as Sun Solaris and Microsoft
Windows.
To test the effectiveness of some of the security features present with
OpenBSD, several scenarios will be enacted based on the security control
in question to illicit the control response and evaluate if the control has
performed as expected, and if that control is aligned with the needs of the
system in that context. For example, execution enforcement controls such
as systrace will be tested by inserting a program into the environment, a
policy defined and the application tested to see what can be achieved outside
of the expected (and policy enforced) functionality. For network elements
(for example, the pf firewall), some open source network scanning tools such
as nmap [19] and other selected penetration test utilities will be applied to
demonstrate the level of robustness and provide evidence of the effectiveness
of that specific control.
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2.5 Document Production
This document was written in LATEXusing vim on OpenBSD 4.1-STABLE.
Diagrams were produced in Microsoft Visio 2007.
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Part II
OpenBSD: Technologies and
Features
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Chapter 3
Overview
This part of the project provides an overview of OpenBSD, its history and
what technologies and security features are present within the operating
system. This project looks at some of the major security features and then
explores how those features are applied in practice:
• What is the security control?
• How does the security control work?
• How can the security control be applied in the context of an FSE?
• Are there problems with the security control, and if so, how can they
be mitigated/compensated?
For pf firewall and systrace, an evaluation of the control’s effectiveness is
provided within an FSE context. This part of the project will also look at
some of the other features of OpenBSD which may be useful in the context
of a secure environment, explore some of the criticism of OpenBSD and its
developers, describe steps to harden the default installation of the operating
system and cover some of the other related issues and challenges.
16
Chapter 4
OpenBSD History, Licensing
and Source Access
4.1 History
OpenBSD is a UNIX-like open-source operating system which is developed
by a team of volunteers and made available free of charge. “BSD” refers
to the heritage of the Berkeley Software Distribution version of UNIX from
which it is derived. BSD originates from the University of Berkeley, Cali-
fornia, USA where it was first forked from an original AT&T UNIX tape
distribution in the late 1970s by two Berkeley students, Bill Joy and Chuck
Haley [20, page 14]. Over the next 35 years, BSD has been continually de-
veloped and split into a number of different flavours, each with their own
focus and aims. Examples of these flavours (and key objectives are) [20,
page 20]:
• FreeBSD - Goal is making BSD easy to use and support many ported
applications.
• NetBSD - Aims to support as many hardware platforms as possible.
• OpenBSD - Focus on code quality, auditing and security.
The OpenBSD project was founded by Theo de Raadt in October 1995
when he forked the NetBSD code base [63, page 9] following several strong
disagreements with the rest of the NetBSD development team [34, page 4].
The first public release of OpenBSD was version 2.0, which was made avail-
able in mid-1997.
Today, OpenBSD is still under active development. Currently at release
4.1, the developers release a new version approximately every six months
[21]. OpenBSD supports a number of processor architectures, including Intel
17
x86, Sun SPARC, DEC Alpha and VAX [59]. OpenBSD’s diverse platform
support comes in part from the original NetBSD fork and Theo de Raadt’s
belief that identifying bugs in code is easier when that code is being run on a
number of different platforms and fixes are applied upstream when problems
are discovered in one area [73]. According to a survey conducted in 2005
by the BSD Certification Group, OpenBSD accounts for approximately one
third of all *BSD installations [4].
4.2 Licensing
Whilst debating the merits of different licensing schemes is outside the scope
of this project, it is worth mentioning that the licensing model utilised for
OpenBSD is different to that of more widely recognised Free, Open Source
Software (FOSS) products such as Linux. OpenBSD is released under the
Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) Licence, which originates from the
University of Berkeley, California, USA. It is important to note that some
non-BSD licensed code such as the gcc compiler (GNU GPL Licence) and
Apache web server (Apache Licence) is included in the OpenBSD base. The
BSD licence allows for commercial companies to take a copy of the code
and extend (or modify) the product then sell the resulting binaries without
having to provide the source code. This is in contrast to the GNU Public
Licence (GPL) which covers software such as Linux which requires that any
changes be made available in source form if changed binaries are released.
Several commercial vendors [40] use OpenBSD as the base of their products.
Licensing is taken extremely seriously by the OpenBSD developers, even
to the extent that a minor change to the licence in a ported application (or
any ambiguity in such) can result in its complete removal from the OpenBSD
ports and packages collection [11].
The fact that OpenBSD (like the other BSDs) is under the Berkeley
licence means that the deployment of the software (whether personal, non-
profit or commercial) incurs no licensing fees, regardless of the number of
users on the system, processors or concurrent processes. This is a stark
contrast to most closed-source commercial operating systems (e.g. Microsoft
Windows), where individual licences may be required for each workstation,
user and server [39].
4.3 Accessing the OpenBSD Source Code
In 1995, Chuck Cranor and Theo de Raadt deployed the very first “anony-
mous” open source CVS (Concurrent Versioning System) server at the Wash-
ington University in St. Louis, Missouri, USA. This system allowed anyone
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with Internet access to browse the source code repository for the OpenBSD
project, and be able to see changes between versions of code. With OpenBSD’s
security goals in-mind, the CVS repository itself was designed to be secure,
with code updates being “pushed” or sent from the Master CVS server (un-
der de Raadt’s control) to the remote Anonymous CVS repositories, from
where anonymous users could then “pull” or download the code to their own
machines. This effectively enforces a one-way data flow, as anonymous users
have no direct access to the Master CVS server and therefore cannot mod-
ify the code as no changes are pulled back to the Master from the satellite
repository systems [12]. However, if an attacker were to be able to com-
promise one of the anonymous CVS repositories and inject malicious code,
then all other users downloading code from that repository would collect the
modified versions and could be susceptible to compiling code which would
allow the attacker to access their systems or perform any other task of their
choice, especially when attacking the source code to the gcc compiler. An
excellent example of such an attack was explored in Ken Thompson’s classic
paper on inserting backdoors into compiler code [78].
It is now common practice for open source projects to feature an on-
line, anonymously accessible read-only CVS server, and many multi-project
open-source community sites (such as Sourceforge.net) have sprung up to
deliver such functionality to small projects [35], many of which may not have
the infrastructure or money to run their own CVS servers.
The OpenBSD development team has decided that the stale, unmain-
tained GNU CVS code is overly complex, and is being rewritten from scratch
as part of the BSD-licensed OpenCVS project [33]. Over time the OpenBSD
project’s CVS repository will be migrated to the new versioning system,
and all OpenBSD developers will work on the system source code via the
OpenCVS repository systems. OpenCVS is still under development and no
timescales have yet been set for the migration.
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Chapter 5
The pf Firewall
5.1 What is pf?
The pf (packet filter) firewall is a BSD licensed piece of software devel-
oped by Daniel Hartmeier for the OpenBSD project in 2001. It replaced
the previous firewall software “IPFilter” owing to licence concerns about
redistribution. The creator of IPFilter, Darren Reed, had included several
licensing stipulations in certain pieces of his software; the OpenBSD team
thought it best to remove his software from OpenBSD and develop their
own solution [10]. The pf firewall is a stateful packet filter which provides
access control checking to network packets arriving on or leaving from the
system running pf. A firewall such as pf is configured through the use of
a policy which specifies how Internet Protocol services are to be handled.
Actions which the system can take include dropping the packet (denying),
forwarding the packet (allowing) or proxying the packet through a interme-
diary control function to validate packet contents. Not only can pf handle
packets to and from itself (i.e. a host-based firewall [65, page 296]), but also
can act as a filter between machines on either side of two network interfaces,
mediating access between the two and enforcing the specified policy. This
can happen either as a routed interception (whereby the pf firewall is a spec-
ified hop in the route) or can be a transparent bridge whereby packets are
silently intercepted through the inbound network interface and inspected
before being passed out through the outbound network interface [79].
Support for various protocols makes pf extremely flexible. At the time
of writing, pf supports both IPv4 and IPv6, which allows system admin-
istrators to define very explicit rule sets, with one system able to handle
and inspect traffic to/from mixed IPv4 and IPv6 networks. Additionally,
OpenBSD can also act as an IPv4-IPv6 gateway, through use of the gif(4)
interface [44]. Network Address Translation (NAT) is supported natively in
pf, as is IP Quality of Service (QoS) via the ALTQ priority mapping.
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The pf firewall is one of many different firewall products available on the
market [16]. IPFilter continues to be developed by its author, and in addi-
tion there are many commercial closed-source firewalls including Checkpoint
Firewall-1 (running on Microsoft Windows, Sun Solaris and the Nokia IPSO
platforms) and Cisco Pix.
5.2 Using pf in an FSE security context
The security properties of pf firewall are key elements to restricting network
access to systems to only those permitted by policy. As will be seen in “Part
III - Compliance, Financial Regulation and Control”, pf is key to delivering
upon a number of compliance requirements, especially for those laid down
in the protection of financially sensitive environments - an example of this
is “Requirement 1: Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect
cardholder data” of the PCI-DSS [64]. In “Part IV - Case Study: Securing
Treasury”, we will look at how a real-world FSE can utilise the pf firewall to
partition network zones into different security segments and define policies
to control communication between them.
5.2.1 Ubiquitous Technology?
According to [15], the use of firewalls is now almost universal (90-97%)
throughout most large businesses. FSEs especially would benefit from the
use of such technology, as setting appropriate firewall policies enables en-
forcement of network level controls over which machines may communicate,
in which directions and with what services.
5.2.2 Auditing Connections
In addition, pf supports logging to a variety of interfaces, including sys-
log [57]. This can provide an audit trail of communications depending on
the type of detail logged, and to which packets logging is applied. If every
connection was to be audited, each would generate a log record complete
with timestamp and other pertinent information - this could generate ex-
tremely high volumes of records and therefore require much disk space. This
would have additional lead-on impact, such as performance of search queries
and ability to securely backup the data. Organisations may wish to apply
restricted logging to only certain types of traffic depending on their risk
profile and business requirements, for example only logging traffic which is
prohibited by policy (denied packets).
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5.2.3 Data Flow Enforcement
As mentioned previously, the use of a firewall technology allows organisa-
tions to stipulate inbound and outbound policies for network traffic, includ-
ing which services. An FSE may make use of such technology in order to
apply a layered security model to its network structure, constraining certain
applications within a semi-public zone to prevent direct access to sensitive
core systems. OpenBSD’s pf allows for configuration of many aliases, tables
and groupings for systems, network segments and service types, for ease
of administration and configuration [56]. An FSE could use a number of
physical interfaces on the firewall system to configure Demilitarised Zones
(DMZs) to setup semi-public network segments in which to host accessible
services such as web servers and mail servers. These will then be constrained
outside of sensitive network areas or core network to limit an attacker’s ac-
cess if one of these services were to be compromised. By setting a restrictive
traffic policy between network zones, it would then require an attacker to
find a path between zones in order to compromise additional systems outside
of the DMZ.
5.2.4 Firewall Administration
Configuration files for pf are plain-text files [47]. Central administration
could be securely and cheaply achieved by using other built-in tools within
OpenBSD. A central firewall administration workstation could be used to
create the policy files, and this system could then copy the policy files to
the target firewall systems using a secure method such as scp or sftp (Secure
Shell (SSH) based secure copy/file transfer mechanisms). Access to the SSH
port on the target firewalls could be restricted to the admin workstation in
the configuration files of pf, sshd or both.
5.2.5 High Availability
OpenBSD’s pf firewall also features Common Address Redundancy Protocol
(CARP) [45] and pfsync [48] which allows for failover of firewall systems to
enable high availability. Should the primary firewall fail, the backup firewall
will detect this and transfer all states and connections to itself using the
heartbeat interface which connects the two firewalls together directly, usu-
ally by a cross-over cable between them. Such functionality is also available
on commercial firewalls, but commonly is only available as an extra module
at significant extra licensing cost [38]. As with the rest of OpenBSD, both
pf (and by extension, CARP, pfsync and all other tools) are free. These
features could also possibly be used to provide high availability functional-
ity to other applications (for example, a financial application server). The
hoststated(8) daemon has been developed to link in with pf to provide load
balancing functionality, to split traffic loads between multiple hosts [46].
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5.3 Problems with pf
At the time of writing there are no published bugs or acknowledged security
issues with pf directly. It is worth noting that the pf filter and NAT rule
files can be set to immutable by raising the kernel’s securelevel to 2 [50].
However, as discussed in the section “Criticism of OpenBSD”, it has recently
been discovered that there are security problems with securelevel(7), and
continued research into the software may find additional issues which could
affect pf’s security when securelevels are used. The use of securelevel(7)
could lead to a false sense of security in this sense, so proper risk management
is required.
5.4 pf - an example in practice
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the pf firewall, the following
example has been constructed which shows a real-world scenario where the
control may be applied in an FSE. In this instance, an OpenBSD system
running the build-in ISC BIND server is used and proves that the filter-
ing capability effectively stops the network access restricted by the pf rule
set. Domain Name Service (DNS, resolving system host names to IP ad-
dresses) is especially important for an FSE, as without proper security con-
trols surrounding it, legitimate traffic may be redirected (DNS Poisoning)
to malicious “phishing” sites where sensitive information may be captured.
A Sun Netra X1 rackmount server running OpenBSD 4.1/sparc64 is the
target machine - the two services accessible are the SSH daemon (sshd, run-
ning on 22/tcp) and BIND (named, running on 53/tcp+udp). A simple pf
rule set has been defined, which permits DNS queries from any system on
the local network, and restricts SSH access to one approved administrative
workstation (10.0.0.1).
5.4.1 System Services
To show the services are running on the target machine (10.0.0.252), the
following commands were executed as root:
TCP services listening: # netstat -an | grep LISTEN
tcp 0 0 ∗ . 22 ∗ .∗ LISTEN
tcp 0 0 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 5 2 . 5 3 ∗ .∗ LISTEN
UDP services listening: # netstat -an | grep 53 | grep udp
udp 0 0 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 5 2 . 5 3 ∗ .∗
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5.4.2 Target machine pf rule set
The following rulset is configured on the target machine (10.0.0.252) within
/etc/pf.conf.
# Macros
i n t i f = "dc0"
l an ne t = "10.0.0.0/24"
# Options
s e t block−po l i c y return
s e t l o g i n t e r f a c e $ i n t i f
s e t sk ip on l o
# Scrub
scrub in a l l
# Defau l t Deny Po l i cy
block in e t 6
block in a l l
pass out
# a c t i v a t e spoo f i ng p ro t e c t i on for a l l i n t e r f a c e s
b lock in quick from urpf−f a i l e d
# Allow SSH from Admin s t a t i o n only
pass in quick on $ i n t i f proto tcp from 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 to $ i n t i f port
ssh
# Allow NTP Requests to this s e r v e r
pass in on $ i n t i f proto udp from $ lan ne t to any port 123
# Allow DNS Requests to this s e r v e r
pass in on $ i n t i f proto { tcp , udp } from $ lan ne t port
1024:65535 to any port 53
# Allow DHCP Requests to this s e r v e r
pass in on $ i n t i f proto udp from any port 67 to any port 68
5.4.3 Results with pf enabled
This section shows the results of various tests with pf enabled and it filtering
packets. In this first scenario, PF is enabled and utilising the rules defined
in the rules shown above.
nmap scan The results from the nmap scan from system 10.0.0.24 show
that only port 53 is accessible as it is not the approved administrative work-
station (10.0.0.1) the SSH port is not visible.
Sta r t i ng Nmap 4 .11 ( http : //www. insecure . org /nmap/ ) at
2007−07−27 13:34 BST
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I n t e r e s t i n g por t s on hades . w i l l owcot tage . net ( 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 5 2 ) :
Not shown : 1679 c l o s ed por t s
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
53/ tcp open domain ISC Bind 9 .X
MAC Address : 0 0 : 0 3 :BA: 1 0 : 6B:09 (Sun Microsystems )
Device type : g ene ra l purpose
Running : OpenBSD 3 .X
OS d e t a i l s : OpenBSD 3 .5 or 3 .6
Nmap f i n i s h e d : 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 9 .576 seconds
DNS Resolution The following test shows the DNS resolution attempt
from 10.0.0.24 resolving OK against the target system using # dig www.google.com
@10.0.0.252
; <<>> DiG 9 . 3 . 4 <<>> www. goog l e . com @10 . 0 . 0 . 2 5 2
; (1 s e r v e r found )
; ; g l oba l opt ions : printcmd
; ; Got answer :
; ; −>>HEADER<<− opcode : QUERY, s t a tu s : NOERROR, id : 16300
; ; f l a g s : qr rd ra ; QUERY: 1 , ANSWER: 5 , AUTHORITY: 6 ,
ADDITIONAL: 0
; ; QUESTION SECTION:
;www. goog l e . com . IN A
; ; ANSWER SECTION:
www. goog l e . com . 70993 IN CNAME www. l . goog l e . com
.
www. l . goog l e . com . 272 IN A 216 . 239 . 59 . 147
www. l . goog l e . com . 272 IN A 216 . 239 . 59 . 9 9
www. l . goog l e . com . 272 IN A 216 . 239 . 59 . 103
www. l . goog l e . com . 272 IN A 216 . 239 . 59 . 104
; ; AUTHORITY SECTION:
l . goog l e . com . 76931 IN NS g . l . goog l e . com .
l . goog l e . com . 76931 IN NS a . l . goog l e . com .
l . goog l e . com . 76931 IN NS b . l . goog l e . com .
l . goog l e . com . 76931 IN NS c . l . goog l e . com .
l . goog l e . com . 76931 IN NS e . l . goog l e . com .
l . goog l e . com . 76931 IN NS f . l . goog l e . com .
; ; Query time : 6 msec
; ; SERVER: 10 . 0 . 0 . 2 52#53 (10 . 0 . 0 . 2 52 )
; ; WHEN: Mon Aug 27 14 : 33 : 47 2007
; ; MSG SIZE rcvd : 212
SSH Connection This test shows the failed attempt to connect from
10.0.0.24 to the DNS server’s SSH port using # ssh 10.0.0.252. This is
refused as the originator (10.0.0.24) is denied from connecting to 22/tcp by
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the target’s pf configuration.
ssh : connect to host 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 5 2 port 22 : Connection r e fu s ed
5.4.4 Results with pf disabled
This section shows the results of various tests with pf disabled and no packet
filtering.
nmap Scan The results from the nmap scan from system 10.0.0.24 show
that both ports 53 and 22 are accessible.
Sta r t i ng Nmap 4 .11 ( http : //www. insecure . org /nmap/ ) at
2007−07−27 13:39 BST
I n t e r e s t i n g por t s on hades . w i l l owcot tage . net ( 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 5 2 ) :
Not shown : 1678 c l o s ed por t s
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/ tcp open ssh OpenSSH 4 .6 ( p ro to co l 2 . 0 )
53/ tcp open domain ISC Bind 9 .X
MAC Address : 0 0 : 0 3 :BA: 1 0 : 6B:09 (Sun Microsystems )
Device type : g ene ra l purpose
Running : OpenBSD 3 .X
OS d e t a i l s : OpenBSD 3 .5 − 3 .9
Nmap f i n i s h e d : 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 26 .321
seconds
DNS Resolution As with the previous test, the following shows the DNS
resolution attempt resolving OK against the target system from 10.0.0.24
using # dig www.google.com @10.0.0.252 - this is owing to the fact that
pf has been disabled and no packet filtering is happening.
; <<>> DiG 9 . 3 . 4 <<>> www. goog l e . com @10 . 0 . 0 . 2 5 2
; (1 s e r v e r found )
; ; g l oba l opt ions : printcmd
; ; Got answer :
; ; −>>HEADER<<− opcode : QUERY, s t a tu s : NOERROR, id : 16300
; ; f l a g s : qr rd ra ; QUERY: 1 , ANSWER: 5 , AUTHORITY: 6 ,
ADDITIONAL: 0
; ; QUESTION SECTION:
;www. goog l e . com . IN A
; ; ANSWER SECTION:
www. goog l e . com . 70993 IN CNAME www. l . goog l e . com
.
www. l . goog l e . com . 272 IN A 216 . 239 . 59 . 147
www. l . goog l e . com . 272 IN A 216 . 239 . 59 . 9 9
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www. l . goog l e . com . 272 IN A 216 . 239 . 59 . 103
www. l . goog l e . com . 272 IN A 216 . 239 . 59 . 104
; ; AUTHORITY SECTION:
l . goog l e . com . 76931 IN NS g . l . goog l e . com .
l . goog l e . com . 76931 IN NS a . l . goog l e . com .
l . goog l e . com . 76931 IN NS b . l . goog l e . com .
l . goog l e . com . 76931 IN NS c . l . goog l e . com .
l . goog l e . com . 76931 IN NS e . l . goog l e . com .
l . goog l e . com . 76931 IN NS f . l . goog l e . com .
; ; Query time : 6 msec
; ; SERVER: 10 . 0 . 0 . 2 52#53 (10 . 0 . 0 . 2 52 )
; ; WHEN: Mon Aug 27 14 : 33 : 47 2007
; ; MSG SIZE rcvd : 212
SSH Connection This test shows the successful attempt to connect from
10.0.0.24 to the DNS server’s SSH port using # ssh 10.0.0.252. This is
accepted as the SSH port is no longer restricted by pf.
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
hades . w i l l owcot tage . net DNS Server
Authorised us e r s only
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
root@10 . 0 . 0 . 2 5 2 ’s  password:
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Chapter 6
OpenSSH
6.1 What is OpenSSH?
OpenSSH is a sub-project of OpenBSD. It is a free, open-source collection of
Secure SHell (SSH) tools providing encrypted replacements for traditional
UNIX utilities such as telnet and ftp [60]. OpenSSH supports both versions
1 and 2 of the SSH protocol standards as defined within [25] and [24]. The
problem with traditional utilities such as Telnet is that the login details
and subsequent command and reply traffic traverses the network in the
clear (plain-text), rendering the stream susceptible to unauthorised reading
and/or modification. The OpenSSH tools mitigate these issues by utilising
secure protocols based on cryptography, with SSH supporting mechanisms
such as public-key based authentication. OpenSSH has become extremely
popular, and has been integrated into many other open-source platforms
(including Linux) and even proprietary systems and devices such as those
manufactured by Nokia, Cisco and HP [61].
6.2 Using OpenSSH in an FSE security context
The use of SSH tools instead of traditional insecure protocols such as Telnet
brings benefits to Financially Sensitive Environments in terms of providing
a degree of assurance over the security of network traffic between systems.
Through encryption of data, a malicious entity could no longer view plain
text intercepted data streams, and through proper validation of host keys,
systems can confirm that the system they are talking to is authentic. The use
of SFTP (Secure Shell FTP [26]) instead of plain text FTP also brings sig-
nificant security benefits, as the login exchange and subsequent data transfer
would be secured by encryption, providing control over both confidentiality
and integrity [2]. An auditor assessing communications between systems
could then be confident that host-host traffic was secured and no longer
liable to potential unauthorised viewing or alteration. By using secure pro-
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tocols instead of insecure ones [65, page 292], problems such as TCP/IP
session hijacking can also be mitigated [17, page 156].
OpenSSH provides a useful set of utilities for administration, file transfer
and tunneling other insecure protocols, building confidentiality and integrity
into communications. In “Part III - Compliance, Financial Regulation and
Control”, we shall see that the need to have assurances over the security of
data in transit can be mapped to OpenSSH’s abilities. The future secure
Treasury design described in “Part IV - Case Study: Securing Treasury”
will show how OpenSSH is a key element in enabling secured administration
of servers, and providing a secure replacement for the Treasury’s previously
insecure file transfers using FTP.
6.3 Problems with OpenSSH
SSH, like other protocols, is susceptible to a “man in the middle” attack, and
if an attacker were able to fool administrators that their SSH host key was
that of the intended target system, then data could be passed to a malicious
third party [2, page 79]. Such an attack can be mitigated by putting in place
proper procedures to validate key fingerprints. A way to approach this for
each system administrator to make note of their valid key fingerprint, and
then confirm this with one another over an out-of-band channel such as by
voice telephone conversation. This in itself requires that the administrators
know and trust each other, and there should be organisational policies in
place with a management approved method for such validation. SSH will
flag an alert on connection if the host key is either unknown or has changed
since the host keys were input, which would alert an administrator that
something had gone awry. Such an incident could indeed be benign, as a
previously valid system which had been upgraded or moved to a new physical
server would generate a different host key the first time the SSH daemon was
invoked [2, page 17]. This is an excellent example of ‘Security as a Process’
and it demonstrates the importance of overall security strategy and wrap-
around policies/procedures to cover management oversight of security across
the enterprise.
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Chapter 7
Systrace System Policies
7.1 What is systrace?
One of the more flexible tools in the OpenBSD system is Systrace. Systrace
was written by Niels Provos and has been part of the base system since
OpenBSD version 3.2 [54]. Systrace “monitors and controls an application’s
access to the system by enforcing access policies for system calls” [53].
Systrace allows system administrators to define a security policy for each
individual application executed on the system, from reading and writing files
to controlling even if the code may make a network connection and then to
what specific host(s). These policy elements can include fine grained control
over execution context of the code, for example only allowing applications to
perform sensitive functions if executed by a user with the appropriate group
membership. Such control even supersedes the all powerful ‘root’ (UID 0)
user, which traditionally has complete control within a UNIX environment.
By generating, fine tuning and enforcing Systrace policies, additional
constraints can be applied to applications above and beyond the level of
control afforded by traditional UNIX control mechanisms such as permis-
sion masks, group membership and firewall configuration.
A good example of Systrace’s flexibility can be demonstrated in its abil-
ity to constrain an application to only be able to read certain files and write
to certain files, all whilst preventing that application from sending or receiv-
ing any network traffic whatsoever. Such a set of controls may be extremely
useful in providing additional security barriers for third party software, some
of which may be emulated, closed-source binaries which cannot be directly
audited as their code is not publicly available for review.
One of the elements of systrace is the writing of policies for use by the
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systrace binary in enforcing controls over the system calls. Systrace has an
automatic generation function (systrace switch -A) whereby an application
can be invoked inside the Systrace wrapper and a policy file generated au-
tomatically as the application is used. This essentially records the system
calls being used, and no controls are applied during the policy generation
process. The output of this automated ‘training mode’ results in a policy
baseline from which duplicate calls can be removed and then the security
officer (or system administrator) can then verify each action as either being
acceptable or not. This then allows the tuning of the policy file, whereby
specific calls can be approved or rejected by use of a fixed policy syntax, as
defined within the systrace manual pages [54].
7.2 Using systrace in an FSE security context
Systrace’s power derives from its ability to define extremely fine grained
permissions over what executing code may do in the form of system calls.
This means that an application can be given only the privileges it needs
to get the job done (Least Privilege). The reality of this ability in an FSE
context is that applications can be constrained to do only their approved
functions, and these functions could then be split out into several roles. As
described in the Treasury Security Assessment (Chapter 21), one of the ma-
jor issues was the world-writable access to plain-text payments files on the
Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) server. Although proper UNIX permission
masks, firewalls and cryptography are part of a solution to adequately ad-
dressing such an issue, the addition of tools like Systrace could complete the
end-to-end security picture by restraining the payments application - for ex-
ample, preventing the writing of any sensitive data outside of pre-approved
directories and only allow the application to transmit payment data to the
approved recipient systems as defined within the systrace rules for the pay-
ments application.
In “Part III - Compliance, Financial Regulation and Control”, we will
explore how the application contraints which can be imposed by Systrace
map to compliance and best practice controls, for example “Control 11.2.2
- Privilege Management” in ISO 17799:2005 [28]. In “Part IV - Case Study:
Securing Treasury”, we will see how the use of Systrace in Treasury could
enhance system integrity by enforcing least privilege for third-party financial
applications which could be compromised.
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7.3 Problems with systrace
Systrace should not be considered a magical solution to application execu-
tion security, as it is not without its own security faults. Whilst writing
this project, a major new flaw has been discovered in systrace, whereby
processing concurrency can be exploited to allow an attacker to escalate his
privileges and bypass auditing [81]. This flaw is so severe that the authors
of the popular SysJail virtualisation environment have placed a notice on
the front page of their website urging all users of SysJail and Systrace to
discontinue using the tools until further notice [76].
7.4 Systrace - an example in practice
7.4.1 A Simple Payments Processing Program
To demonstrate the effectiveness of systrace, an example has been created
to explore policy file creation, modification and subsequent invocation. To
start with, a directory was created for testing a simple shell script and the
script generated within it, plus some directories against which the policy
could be tuned. The /var/test directory contains two sub-directories:
/var/test/hr Human Resources Records
/var/test/payments Payment files
In this example, the shell script will act in place of a payment server ap-
plication that should only be able to read files from the payments directory.
It should not be able to read anything from the human resources directory.
In order to show how userid is irrelevant for systrace, the program will be
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invoked as the root user. The shell script (/var/test/myprog.sh) is as
follows:
#! / bin / sh
cat payments/pay001 . dat
cat hr/ employees . txt
7.4.2 Generating a Systrace Policy
To generate the initial systrace policy file, the program was invoked as #
systrace -d /var/test -A ./myprog.sh - the output produced from this
command is:
BIC0001 DGHN56 GBP 130098729.11 2016778 18−02−90
BLOGGS, J . 18−09−76 372728 London
FOX, M. 16−02−83 637281 Maidstone
The output above shows the test script echoing the payment file and
then the Human Resources file. This is owing to the fact that Systrace is
in learning mode, and the whole program runs as normal without any con-
traints. The resulting policy file was placed into the /var/test directory
as var test myprog sh. The policy file produced is as follows:
Pol i cy : / var / t e s t /myprog . sh , Emulation : nat ive
nat ive− s y s c t l : permit
nat ive−mmap: prot eq "PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE" then permit
nat ive−mprotect : prot eq "PROT_READ" then permit
nat ive−f s r e ad : f i l ename eq "/etc/malloc.conf" then
permit
nat ive−i s s e t u g i d : permit
nat ive−s i g a c t i o n : permit
nat ive−getp id : permit
nat ive− getcwd : permit
nat ive−getppid : permit
nat ive−gett imeofday : permit
nat ive−geteu id : permit
nat ive−getu id : permit
nat ive−ge tg id : permit
nat ive−ge t eg id : permit
nat ive−f s r e ad : f i l ename eq "/var/test/myprog.sh" then
permit
nat ive−f c n t l : cmd eq "F_DUPFD" then permit
nat ive−c l o s e : permit
nat ive−f c n t l : cmd eq "F_SETFD" then permit
nat ive−f s t a t : permit
nat ive−s igprocmask : permit
nat ive−read : permit
nat ive−f s r e ad : f i l ename eq "/sbin/cat" then permit
nat ive−f s r e ad : f i l ename eq "/usr/sbin/cat" then permit
nat ive−f s r e ad : f i l ename eq "/bin/cat" then permit
nat ive−f o rk : permit
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nat ive−s ig suspend : permit
nat ive−execve : f i l ename eq "/bin/cat" and argv eq "cat 
payments/pay001.dat" then permit
nat ive−get rusage : permit
nat ive−wait4 : permit
nat ive−s i g r e t u r n : permit
nat ive−execve : f i l ename eq "/bin/cat" and argv eq "cat 
hr/employees.txt" then permit
nat ive−munmap: permit
nat ive−e x i t : permit
7.4.3 Modifying the Systrace Policy
This automatically created policy (as it stands) allows the program to “cat”
the contents of the data files to the terminal - we now need to restrict this
so that only the payments file can be read by the payments application
test script. By removing the native-execve entry for the hr/employees.txt
file and saving the modified policy, we can now re-run the systraced pro-
gram using the modified systrace policy # systrace -a -d /var/test -E
/var/test/systrace.log ./myprog.sh. The resulting output from the
program running wrapped in the modified policy is:
BIC0001 DGHN56 GBP 130098729.11 2016778 18−02−90
The script has now been unable to access the HR file. To verify that
access to the file has been denied by systrace policy, we can review the log
file (generated with the systrace switch -E) at /var/test/systrace.log:
s y s t r a c e : deny user : root , prog : / var / t e s t /myprog . sh , pid :
22302(0) [ 9 0 4 2 ] , p o l i c y : / var / t e s t /myprog . sh , f i l t e r s : 33 ,
s y s c a l l : nat ive−execve (59) , f i l ename : / bin / cat , argv : cat hr/
employees . txt
s y s t r a c e : deny user : root , prog : / var / t e s t /myprog . sh , pid :
22302(0) [ 9 0 4 2 ] , p o l i c y : / var / t e s t /myprog . sh , f i l t e r s : 33 ,
s y s c a l l : nat ive−f s r e ad (5 ) , f i l ename : / usr / share / n l s /C/ l i b c .
cat
s y s t r a c e : deny user : root , prog : / var / t e s t /myprog . sh , pid :
22302(0) [ 9 0 4 2 ] , p o l i c y : / var / t e s t /myprog . sh , f i l t e r s : 33 ,
s y s c a l l : nat ive−f s r e ad (5 ) , f i l ename : /<non−e x i s t e n t f i l ename
>: / usr / share / n l s / l i b c /C
This test shows that the reading of files has been restricted to only those
permitted within the systrace policy. More complex policy files can restrict
access to network resources, system memory, file access modes (read, write,
execute) or any other operation performed via a system call.
The next test is to simulate an attacker having been successful in in-
serting malicious code into the payments application. In this case, we shall
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insert the command cat /etc/master.passwd into the test script, which
would display the contents of the shadow password file containing the en-
crypted password hashes. As the application script is running as root, it
would by default have access to this file. If we re-run the test script again,
the output remains the same:
BIC0001 DGHN56 GBP 130098729.11 2016778 18−02−90
To prove that the access was intercepted and denied by policy, we can
view the resulting systrace.log file entry:
s y s t r a c e : deny user : root , prog : / var / t e s t /myprog . sh , pid :
15791(0) [ 2 7 203 ] , p o l i c y : / var / t e s t /myprog . sh , f i l t e r s : 33 ,
s y s c a l l : nat ive−execve (59) , f i l ename : / bin / cat , argv : cat /
e t c /master . passwd
Such restrictions prove that systrace has the capability to constrain the
actions of modified programs, even when run in the security context of the
most powerful user (root) on the system.
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Chapter 8
Memory Protection Features
8.1 Features within OpenBSD
8.1.1 WˆX
The WˆX feature helps make exploitation of certain software bugs more
difficult by setting a portion of memory either Writable OR eXecutable. In
this way, a portion of memory to which an application may write can then
not also be executable, which means if unauthorised instructions are written
into that portion of memory, that the particular area of memory cannot then
be subsequently executed. On some hardware architectures, this feature is
supported in hardware (such as sparc, sparc64 and alpha), whereas on other
architectures such as i386 the feature requires binary changes [8, page 5]. An
example of this is if a stack overflow [36, page 290] is found in an application
and an attacker can insert a privilege command [71, page 565], but with
WˆX this code stack may have been modified but the contents would not
be executable.
8.1.2 .rodata Segment
This is where program constants, strings and pointers, are stored in a read-
only segment to prevent any run-time modification of constants being exe-
cuted [8, page 13]. The developers intended that the address spaces have a
minimal set of permissions (Least Privilege).
8.1.3 Randomized malloc() and mmap()
This feature randomises the address spaces used by an application each
time it is run, mitigating exploits against fixed memory mapped spaces [7,
page 22]. As the application would use a different memory allocation each
time, a fixed address exploit would be unlikely to set to the right address
location, making that exploit unworkable.
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8.1.4 strlcpy() and strlcat()
Ubiquitous C string functions such as strcpy() and strcat() (copy and con-
catenate) have been replaced in recent years with strncpy() and strncat(),
which now require that the length of the string be defined. However, strn-
cat() and strncpy() require that the programmer understand some detailed
nuances, and also the two functions are unable to detect truncation. In
response to this problem, Theo de Raadt and Todd C. Miller created the
strlcpy() and strlcat() functions which “guarantee to NUL-terminate the des-
tination string for all strings where the given size is non-zero” [13]. These
new functions give programmers an easier way to handle fixed length buffers
and reduce the potential for overflows which can then be exploited to gain
access or raise privilege with injected code.
8.2 Using memory protection in an FSE security
context
Most of the memory protection features within OpenBSD could be viewed
as an indirect (and in some cases, transparent) benefit to using the operating
system. With some of the key controls based within the kernel, the bene-
fits are derived simply from using applications on the operating system and
without any user or administrator involvement. With regards to security
within an FSE, these additional controls could be regarded as compensating
or mitigating controls for potentially problematic applications. OpenBSD’s
ability to emulate other UNIX systems (such as HP-UX) means that an
application could be hosted on OpenBSD with binary emulation, and with
security features such as memory protection, the pf firewall and systrace, al-
low for a much tighter control over the execution of that business application.
In using OpenBSD to host financially sensitive applications, auditors could
be given a higher degree of confidence over the execution security of those
applications, as they would be subject to constraints which make exploita-
tion by attackers that much more difficult, such as the injection of shellcode
[17, page 84], controls which may not be available on the application’s native
Operating System.
8.3 Problems with memory protection features
One of the key challenges with memory protection is that for some of the
controls they must be actively utilised by programmers in the creation of
software. This is certainly evident in third-party software which is present
in the OpenBSD ports tree, as the ports maintainers often have to create
patch files in order to modify the base code of a ported application to use
safer functions like strlcpy() instead of strncpy() [13]. Such activities require
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careful code auditing to make sure that the unsafe functions are captured
and corrected, either by manual code review, the use of file scanning tools
or a combination of both. For larger software projects in the OpenBSD
ports/packages collection (such as OpenOffice or Firefox) which run into tens
or hundreds of thousands of lines of code, such a task can be a significant
investment of time and resources.
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Chapter 9
Auditing
9.1 Auditing within OpenBSD
9.1.1 syslog
As with most implementations of UNIX, OpenBSD includes a syslog daemon
which captures and records messages generated by the system and applica-
tions [52]. These records can retained in a number of ways, from writing to
disk-based files, sending the messages to a remote syslog server, outputting
to physical printer or a combination of those methods. These can be tuned
depending on the security requirements of the environment, and syslog levels
can be redefined to allow efficient capture of log messages to support wider
infrastructure monitoring solutions.
In “Part III - Compliance, Financial Regulation and Control”, we will
see how auditing and the proper management of logs maps to compliance
and best practice controls, including Section “10.10 Monitoring” in ISO
17799:2005 [28] and “Requirement 10: Track and monitor all access to net-
work resources and cardholder data” in PCI-DSS [64]. In “Part IV - Case
Study: Securing Treasury”, we shall see how OpenBSD’s logging features
can be applied to an FSE in order to meet requirements and provide a trail
of evidence for financial processing.
9.2 What additional auditing features are avail-
able?
9.2.1 Output to Physical Log Printer
OpenBSD’s syslog implementation allows for the printing of syslog messages
as they arrive. This may be an especially useful control for jurisdictions
where hard copy evidence is required for prosecution of system intruders.
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An example of UNIX logs being output to hard-copy paper trail was demon-
strated in [74], where the terminal traffic was copied to physical printers for
use as evidence in the case of KGB hacker Markus Hess, as he infiltrated
US universities and military computer networks. OpenBSD can be config-
ured to log to the physical printer by setting /etc/syslog.conf to redirect
messages to the physical printer device (such as /dev/lpt0).
9.2.2 Logging to Write-Once, Read-Many Media
If logs are sitting on a server in an electronic format then they could be
susceptible to modification. By placing logs onto CD-Recordable or DVD-
Recordable media, then a write-once copy of the log files would then be
placed onto optical media which cannot be modified. Owing to the nature
of technology, it is not possible to write message-by-message records to the
disc, which means that a buffer of messages would have to be stored on
the logging system and could then be susceptible to in-buffer modification
before the logs were written onto the disc.
9.3 Using auditing in an FSE security context
Proper audit trails are a core requirement of most financial environments,
and many of the standards and regulations for these industries mandate
proper log controls, for example PCI-DSS [64, Requirement 10] and the
UK Financial Services Authority controls [18, SYSC]. The generation of
audit trails enables financially sensitive environments to be able to trace
transactions and activities, which is crucial in financial transactions not only
to support correctness and aid in finding transaction problems, but also to
discourage (and discover where necessary) fraud by employees, partners and
suppliers who may have access to payment or accounting systems.
9.4 Problems with auditing
9.4.1 Physical Logs Under Attack
In [20, page 670] it is recommended that such physical output be sent to
a dedicated progressive printer (such as a dot matrix) as output to a page
printer would be cached until a whole pages worth of data was ready to
be printed, and as such the stored print buffer could be tampered with
by the attacker to alter the output or even to prevent the physical output
altogether. In addition, once an intruder has gained a privileged level of
access to the system, they could disable the logging or permanently modify
logging daemons to mask their activity. However, even a progressive printer
could be attacked directly to damage the physical output the attacker could
reverse feed the print paper to overwrite or modify the printed log data,
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rendering the physical copies potentially inadmissible in court by introducing
doubt as to their integrity. In a single page output buffer print scenario, such
an attack would not be possible as the physical page would be detached and
dropped into the output bin, requiring physical presence to feed the sheet
back into the printer (or steal it!), however, any buffered page output could
be attacked and subject to modification or erasure. By dedicating a printer
to physical log output and forbidding its use for other purposes, the log
prints can be segregated from normal non-auditing traffic. If the logs were
to be interleaved with day-to-day print jobs then the integrity of the printed
copies could be called into question, or system users might remove crucial
paper trail evidence from the environment.
9.4.2 Dangers of Optical Media
Having the logs written to optical media may mitigate some of the risks
associated with modification, but this also raises the issue of trust with the
personnel tasked with replacing and storing the CD media. If an IT admin-
istrator was to replace the disk with a falsified disc of records, then malicious
or fraudulent activity could go undetected. Such an activity requires that
appropriate procedures and processes surround the log media and disc rota-
tion, and this is an excellent example of where the “Two Man Rule” would
be well placed to require collusion between two or more members of staff to
change the disc. This could be achieved by having a locked cabinet surround-
ing the log server, which required two keys held by two different members
of staff. Both of these personnel would have to work in concert to open the
secure cabinet, and this could mitigate the risk provided that procedures
were well defined and staff had been properly trained. An additional paper
based log would be useful as it would hold a record of access to the cabinet.
Proper labelling (possibly using media stamped with tamper-evident holo-
gram stickers) could also be applied to the media to ensure that valid media
was being taken from the server before being stored.
9.4.3 Generation of Audit Trails
An important consideration for generating audit trails is making sure that
the system is in fact generating the right logs, or even logging at all. A
compromised application may have its logging disabled or modified by the
attacker which will render the resulting logs inaccurate, so this raises the
question about if auditing is embedded within application, the operating
system, external to the system or a combination of all three. If an attacker
is able to inject a root-kit into the system, then is the whole system and its
logs trustworthy [32]? The generation of audit trails will of course create
additional requirements for disk space, which is an important considera-
tion. The question of the right data being logged is also key to ensuring
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that appropriate response is taken to flagged issues. If every single trans-
action is logged, and every piece of information about that transaction, is
it generating too much data to actually be analysed, and are the organisa-
tion’s administrators actually looking at these logs? The use of intelligent
filtering and alert thresholds may help in this respect, but defining logging
levels and verbosity is itself a significant project which requires that the
IT administrative staff are fully aware of the system’s capabilities and have
enough training and knowledge to implement the right level of logging for
the right sorts of transactions and activities happening within the system
environment and applications.
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Chapter 10
Other Relevant Features
10.1 Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks (RAID)
OpenBSD has driver support for a number of hardware RAID cards from a
variety of vendors including Adaptec, 3WARE and Areca [59, RAID Sup-
port]. This allows system administrators to increase availability of systems
in instances of a failed disk (provided that the RAID set has been properly
configured). In addition to hardware support, OpenBSD also contains sup-
port for a software based RAID system called RAIDframe [63, page 172].
This system allows an administrator to define volume sets and configure
RAID1 mirroring at the Operating System level. At the time of writing,
RAIDframe is limited to support for non-booting partitions only, which
means that the root / partition cannot be mirrored (this is from where the
bsd kernel boots). Whilst partitions can be configured in a mirrored con-
figuration to provide failover support for data, if the actual root partition
becomes damaged then action will be required to boot the system as the
root drive will be inaccessible. This limitation is owing to the fact that the
support for RAIDframe lies within the kernel, not the hardware itself. This
“chicken and egg” situation means that in order to access the kernel the
system must be able to boot from a non-RAIDframe enabled root volume.
This problem can be avoided by utilising hardware RAID, which acts trans-
parently to the operating system (although drivers are still needed for the
hardware RAID device once past the initial boot sequence). For systems
where a bootable root partition and battery backed caching is not critical,
RAIDframe can be a cheaper option for implementing disk mirroring.
In a financially sensitive environment, there is a need to ensure that data
is available for processing when necessary, and the use of RAID can help to
provide a degree of resilience to hard disk drives as data can be striped
or mirrored across a number of physical disks, depending on the RAID
level selected. Different RAID levels provide different levels of resilience
43
and performance, depending on which one is selected. For example, an
FSE might choose RAID 1+0 (Mirrored Stripes) for servers requiring high
performance, but this demands that twice the amount of physical storage is
available (200 GB RAID 1 requires two 200 GB Disks).
10.2 Network Time Protocol (NTP)
It is important to note that properly synchronised times on systems are
needed to help ensure accurate maintenance and running of scheduled tasks.
Additionally, in the event of a security breach the production of logs with
inaccurate times may be inadmissible in court or if allowed, heavily con-
tested by defence counsel and used to weaken the prosecution’s case. Such
discrepancies would also be unacceptable on an audit report. In a Finan-
cially Sensitive Environment, the accuracy of time is vital to transactions,
as many are time-dependent or based on duration (for example, fixed-term
deposits and bonds).
One of the major issues associated with logging is the need to ensure ac-
curate and well synchronised time [82]. Network Time Protocol (NTP) is an
unsecured protocol, so the OpenBSD developers have created a sub-project
called OpenNTPd [55], which provides a privilege separated time synchro-
nisation daemon. Whilst OpenNTPd does not address the security of the
network traffic (i.e. the integrity of the time data) owing to contraints of
the NTP protocol and the need to maintain compatability with other NTP
time servers, it does address the faults with the ISC NTP implementation
by keeping the privileged parts of the network daemon separate from those
that do not require privileges.
In recent years, work has continued to support accurate time sources in
OpenBSD [1], including the creation of the mbg(4) driver to support a range
of industrial-grade radio synchronised clocks manufactured by the German
company, Meinberg Funkuhren. These devices allow time synchronisation
between the global GPS system (accessed through nmea(4)) and also the
German DCF77 time signal. Some organisations may require a high-quality
and high-accuracy time signal such as that provided by radio clocks or GPS
for their business applications.
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Chapter 11
Hardening OpenBSD
OpenBSD prides itself on being “Secure by Default”, and comes with mini-
mal services and daemons running in its freshly installed configuration [58].
Other operating systems come with many services activated by default in-
cluding server daemons such as web server services. Examples of this are
Solaris 9 [27] and Windows 2000 [3]. A system administrator unaware of
such default functionality may leave services running, exposing the server
to potential routes of compromise through inadvertent attack vectors (for
example, a dedicated database server would most likely not require a web
server service to be started). Such default states require that an administra-
tor ‘lock down’ the system by hardening the default configuration including
disabling unnecessary services, reconfiguring needed services or altering ba-
sic system parameters. Whilst OpenBSD is delivered in a minimal state,
there are some services still running which many systems administrators
may wish to disable. In addition, certain configuration parameters for some
services could be tightened up further by default, for instance the default
configuration of the X Windows server listening on 6000/tcp.
11.1 sshd Configuration
The OpenSSH [60] server daemon which is included as part of the base in-
stallation of OpenBSD is configured via the /etc/ssh/sshd config file [51].
Within this file the configuration parameters can be altered in a number of
ways, from starting sshd listening on IPv4 only, to enforcing authentication
by public key.
11.1.1 SSH v1 and Man-in-the-Middle
At the time of writing, the default parameters within /etc/ssh/sshd config
allow the use of both SSHv1 and SSHv2. SSHv1 is susceptible to a man-
in-the-middle attack [62], but the merits of SSHv1 versus SSHv2 have been
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debated, with Theo de Raadt even stating that he believes that the added
complexity of SSHv2 may have additional security issues [9].
11.2 Disabling Unnecessary Services
As described above, OpenBSD installs by default with far fewer active ser-
vices/daemons than other operating systems. However, there are still some
smaller services enabled through the super daemon inted (configured via
/etc/inetd.conf) which are frequently unused and can be removed - these
include ident, daytime, time, comsat and chargen. These can be commented
out in inetd.conf or preferably the inetd super daemon can be disabled by
setting INETD="NO" in /etc/rc.conf. Fewer services listening on network
ports will mean that there are fewer routes for potential exploitation.
11.3 Legal Warning banner
11.3.1 Background
In certain jurisdictions, a legal warning banner may be mandatory to alert
users that their activities may be logged and monitored. Such banners can
be configured in OpenBSD to appear on network login (via SSH or Telnet)
and additionally through the “Message of the Day”.
11.3.2 Message of the Day
Upon login to most UNIX systems, the user will be presented with a “Mes-
sage of the Day” set by the system administrator to alert her to various
issues or notifications of importance either to the system itself or for the
wider organisation. In OpenBSD this file is found at /etc/motd. Such files
are commonly used to communicate information such as planned mainte-
nance on the system, and when it will be unavailable. Such a file can also
be used to display security-related information, such as reminding users of
the Acceptable Use Policy, or a secondary copy of the legal warning banner
to ensure that users are made aware of organisational policies. In an FSE
context, this file could also be used to remind users of the importance of
data handling, or how to contact their data protection/information security
officers should they detect suspicious activity.
11.3.3 Telnet and SSH Banners
As described above, Telnet and sshd banners can be configured to be dis-
played upon login. These can be symlinked to a single banner file to aid in
administration through the use of ln -s and creating symbolic links to the
desired standard text file. The banner for sshd is set in /etc/ssh/sshd config.
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11.4 Basic pf Firewall Rules
11.4.1 Restricting Administrative Access
Whilst the configuration of a firewall rule set is very much dependent on the
required functionality of the system in question, a simple pf policy can be
put in place to restrict access to the SSH port for remote administration. In
the example below, 10.0.0.1 is used as an example adminstrative worksta-
tion.
# Macros , define network i n t e r f a c e phy s i c a l r e f e r e n c e
i n t i f = "dc0"
# Skip checks on l o c a l t r a f f i c
s e t sk ip on l o
# Scrub a l l inbound packets
scrub in a l l
# Defau l t Deny Po l i cy
block in e t 6
block in a l l
pass out
# a c t i v a t e spoo f i ng p ro t e c t i on for a l l i n t e r f a c e s
b lock in quick from urpf−f a i l e d
# Allow SSH from Admin s t a t i o n only
pass in quick on $ i n t i f proto tcp from 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 to $ i n t i f port
ssh
11.4.2 Limiting Outbound Traffic
Depending on the system, there may also be a requirement to limit outbound
traffic originating from the system (for example, to restrict network access
to malicious code which may have been installed onto the system). In order
to achieve this, the pass out clause can be removed and explicit permitted
traffic rules defined to stipulate what outbound connections are acceptable
based on organisational and/or system security policy.
11.5 Removing TCP Listener from X
OpenBSD’s default configuration for X Windows allows remote users to con-
nect to the X server over TCP port 6000. For many organisations they may
wish for only the local user to be able to connect the X server, and such
functionality would present another potential route for a remote attacker to
gain access to the system. The default TCP port listener can be disabled
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by modifying the file /usr/X11R6/bin/startx, changing the value of pa-
rameter serverargs to "-nolisten tcp". The next time the X server is
restarted, the X server will no longer be listening on 6000/tcp - this can be
verified by running netstat -an | grep 6000 - if nothing appears then the
port is no longer listening, and remote connections inbound to the X server
will no longer be possible. Such access could additionally be restricted by
placing an appropriate pf firewall policy on the system and enabling the pf
functionality to filter out such connections to the system.
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Chapter 12
Systems Administration and
OpenBSD
12.1 Patching OpenBSD
One of the key elements to administering any system is keeping the software
up-to-date, especially patches for software with known defects or exploitable
weaknesses.
12.1.1 Patching Systems - Release, Stable or Current?
OpenBSD can be kept up-to-date in a number of ways. The CD-ROMs
released approximately every six months can be patched with the errata
fixes from the OpenBSD website [42], whereby affected portions of code
are patched and recompiled directly. Other options include following the -
STABLE or -CURRENT branches of the OpenBSD CVS. STABLE contains
the latest release, plus all errata fixes and fixed ports, whereas CURRENT
is reflective of the current source tree which is under development. Every six
months, the CURRENT tree is tagged as beta and made ready for the next
release, pending testing. A ‘snapshot’ of the -CURRENT tree is regularly
compiled and made available through the OpenBSD project’s FTP servers.
Keeping systems up-to-date in this way may be fine for one or two sys-
tems, but what about organisations with many systems? Is one expected to
manually re-patch every single system? Does a systems administrator want
to keep a complete copy of the source code on each and every system, and
make sure that it is kept fresh? Most likely the answer to this would be
no, as the overhead of such activity would be significant and cause a time
issue for systems administrators. A solution to this problem lies either in
the ‘Binary Patches’ or Releases tools, which are described below.
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12.1.2 Binary Patches
In recent years a non-OpenBSD project called binpatch [66] has sprung up
to try to fill the gap of applying binary patches (much like those distributed
for other operating systems such as Microsoft Windows and HP-UX) to
OpenBSD systems. This project aims to give system administrators the
ability to generate their own binary patches to apply to their systems, which
removes the need to build internal releases through which to apply patches
via an upgrade by installing a custom ‘Release’. However, it is noted that
the OpenBSD developers have made it very clear that this project is not
official and not associated with the base system [67]. At the time of writing,
no official binary patch tools are available or planned.
12.2 Making Releases
12.2.1 Overview
The OpenBSD system allows for the creation of “releases” [49], whereby an
organisation’s system administrator can take one copy of the source code,
keep that one copy up-to-date with fixes, add in whatever organisation-
specific changes are required, and blend in post-install scripts to make sys-
tem deployment easier through automation. A security conscious systems
administrator could then focus on one trusted code base, and increase her
confidence that the systems being deployed within the organisation were
being done so from a single point of control.
12.2.2 Single Code Base Security?
An organisation with a requirement for the “Two Man Rule” could config-
ure the source code system itself to enforce higher levels of auditing, and
require at least two members of staff to make a change to the code base. Such
controls could be put in place by way of a source code database, whereby a
change was input by one administrator, then flagged for review and approval
by a second administrator. Such controls may help an FSE achieve compli-
ance with ensuring proper oversight of changes to systems. The are currently
no tools to achieve this with the basic OpenBSD base system, they must
either be developed in-house or a third-party contracted to develop them as
bespoke software.
12.3 Change Control
Whilst outside the scope of this project, it is worth mentioning that “change
and release” control is vital to system stability, security and ensuring that
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the enterprise platform remains compliant within the realms of the estab-
lished corporate governance framework. Any changes to a system should
be properly authorised, processed and documented. OpenBSD contains no
built-in controls by default to this end, however it is possible to extend func-
tionality (as with almost any open-source project) by adding additional code
or implementing a separate package to handle such matters. Proper change
management, authorisation and management oversight of such activities are
often core elements of standards and regulatory/statutory practices, includ-
ing Sarbanes-Oxley (if one were not to, could management prove ‘adequate
control’?), ITIL and ISO/IEC 17799. More recent standards such as the
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS) explicitly sets
out the need for proper change management [64], and this is also a key part
of best-practice methodologies like ITIL and COBIT [30].
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Chapter 13
Criticism of OpenBSD
13.1 IPv6 mbuf Patch Issue
The OpenBSD team’s response to a security issue in early 2007 came under
fire when Core Security discovered a problem in the way the kernel would
handle a fragmented, customised packet [6]. Despite Core Security’s con-
cerns about the severity of the flaw, the OpenBSD team initially responded
with a patch marked as a “Reliability Fix”, arguing that the flaw could not
be exploited so far down the mbuf chain. Core Security responded by de-
veloping Proof of Concept (PoC) code to exploit the vulnerability, and the
OpenBSD team then reissued the patch and labelled the new version as a
“Security Fix”. The code flaw, and resulting drama by the developers, was
covered by several major technology news sites, including Slashdot.org [72].
13.2 Securelevels
In 2005, OpenBSD founder Theo de Raadt received criticism for his re-
sponse regarding a flaw found by RedTeam Pentesting in “securelevels” (a
common component of the BSD and Linux families) from the high-profile
information security website SecurityFocus [70]. Securelevels is a function
within the kernel which seeks to prevent certain behaviour even from the
root user. An example of this is the changing of extremely sensitive files.
In this particular flaw, an attacker could mount a file system over the top
of immutable files, effectively linking an attackers choice of hostile code to
previously trusted binaries. Theo de Raadt’s response was:
“Sorry, we are going to change nothing. Securelevels are useless.”
The SecurityFocus article went on to explore the impact of such a state-
ment, and questioned why, if securelevels are useless, are they still kept
within OpenBSD? The argument made by SecurityFocus was that if in fact
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this code is “useless” why not remove it and thereby not give users a false
sense of security. Further discussion on the misc@openbsd.org mailing list
discussed removing the code from OpenBSD and using more advanced tech-
nologies such as Systrace instead. To this day, the securelevels functionality
remains within the operating system. The article also states that NetBSD
is immune to this attack, but this is owing to the fact that NetBSD does
not allow any mounting by default [68].
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Chapter 14
Infrastructure Diversity and
Security
One of the core considerations for any security implementation is evaluating
the quality of products intended for deployment. If a single technology is
chosen to provide security across multiple layers of the architecture, then
a failing in that product may affect all layers on which it is installed. For
example, in highly sensitive environments employing two or more firewalls in
serial to filter traffic, if the same firewall product (and by extension, version
and configuration) is used, then a flaw found in the outer most perimeter
would also be present on the inner perimeter, making an attacker’s job a
case of simply exploiting the same flaw twice to gain the required access.
By diversifying the product range used in such scenarios, a flaw in one
product may not be present in others, requiring an external attacker to pen-
etrate two layers of firewall defence before being able to breach the inner
perimeter. A diverse environment brings with it other challenges and con-
siderations, notably the need for support staff to be trained in both product
lines, patch and maintain two sets of systems and also maintain credentials
for both systems unless a single sign-on is supported - indeed this too may
lead to issues where one compromised set of credentials could then be used
to alter security devices to the attacker’s desired configuration.
An organisation must perform an adequate risk assessment to explore
such issues and determine their appetite for risk and available budget. Wider
organisational issues may also drive a particular technology’s usage, and all
developments of hardware and software should be carefully considered.
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Part III
Compliance, Financial
Regulation and Control
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Chapter 15
Overview
A challenge for business (and in particular, financials firms) is ensuring that
organisational policies, procedures, processes, guidelines and standards are
aligned not only with international regulatory standards (e.g. Basel II)
but also national law (e.g. US Sarbanes-Oxley Act [80]) and local regula-
tors (United Kingdom Financial Services Authority [18]). Coupled with the
ISO standards for banking and financial systems (e.g. ISO/TR 17944 [29]),
standards for quality (ISO 9001) and information security (ISO 17799 [28],
27001) plus best practice (COBIT [30]), bringing all of these together and
synchronising them with the needs of the business can be an exceptionally
difficult task, especially in the context of large organisations with heteroge-
neous platforms and a diverse array of legacy systems.
With the introduction of new compliance standards, such as those de-
veloped by the credit card industry (Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standards (PCI-DSS)) often comes prescriptive and very specific control
sets [64] which must be adhered to in order to be certified as an authorised
partner in financial networks. PCI-DSS is an excellent example of specific
controls leading to accreditation, as a registered QSA (Qualified Security
Assessor) who is trained and recognised by the PCI partnership must be en-
gaged to provide certification for certain organisations, depending on their
transactional and monetary volumes within a financial year.
This section discusses some of the applicable standards and regulato-
ry/statutory areas which could affect a Financially Sensitive Environment,
and how OpenBSD and its security features might be used to create and
maintain compliance/certification.
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Chapter 16
Aligning Governance,
Oversight and Regulation
With the vast array of different legislation, regulatory bodies requirements
and various standards, organisations have to find a way to consolidate and
understand their obligations, and map these to appropriate security controls
which are both cost-effective and sufficient to ensure compliance. Some areas
of major controls packages and standards can be mapped to one another
fairly well, but others may require much more careful alignment to ensure
that the nuances and specifics are not lost in the mapping process. Having
one consolidated list of controls may aid an organisation in respect to its
security strategy and vision, whereas multiple lists may confuse issues and
result in non-compliance where certain controls have been missed owing to
misalignment or a failure to understand the requirements. Examples of some
of the areas which are commonly encountered include:
• Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (USA)
• Financial Services Authority (UK)
• Basel II (Worldwide)
• Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards (PCI-DSS)
• ISO/IEC 17799 (leading to ISO 27001 certification)
• ISACA COBIT 4.1
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Chapter 17
Mapping Requirements to
OpenBSD
The table below is a sample of a proposed mapping model for various differ-
ent control sets and regulations (such as ISO/IEC 17799:2005 [28], COBIT
4.0 [30], PCI-DSS v1.1 [64]) against OpenBSD’s security features:
COBIT 4.0 ISO 17799:2005 PCI-DSS 1.1 OpenBSD Control(s)
DS5.10 11.4 Network Requirement 1: Install pf firewall
Network Security. Access Control and maintain a firewall
configuration to protect
cardholder data.
DS5.5 Testing, 10.10 Monitoring Requirement 10: Track Syslog, system
Surveillance and and monitor all access accounting
Monitoring. to network resources
and cardholder data.
DS5.9 Malicious 10.4 Protection Requirement 5: Use and Systrace, clamav
Software Prevention, against malicious regularly update anti- (3rd party), mtree
Detection and and mobile code. virus software.
Correction.
In the table above, we can see that the mapping of network securi-
ty/access control could be achieved by utilising the pf firewall (discussed
in Chapter 5) with OpenBSD. The requirements for auditing could well be
met by proper configuration of Syslog in OpenBSD, provided that there
are adequate controls over the resulting log files (as we saw in Chapter 9).
Other requirements and controls can be met by many of the other security
features discussed in “Part II - OpenBSD: Technologies and Features”, and
indeed some of the controls are discussed in the context of defining a secure
environment for a real-world Treasury department in “Part IV - Case Study:
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Securing Treasury”.
For different environments, an organisation may define different weight-
ings in order to give a preferred balance, based on the appetite for risk
which is accepted by management within the organisation. For heteroge-
neous environments, it could be that certain controls do not map accurately
to a technical solution, so compensating or mitigating controls may be put
in place by cross-referencing to an alternative suitable control, or possibly
utilising a different platform to provide the necessary control within the en-
vironment (for example, by placing a capable application proxy in front of a
problematic application server which is unable to properly support a suitable
security control). Proper application of controls within appropriate areas of
the business are vital to ensuring the security of the whole environment,
especially for financial environments which may be exposed to fraudulent
activity by internal staff [14, page 151].
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Chapter 18
Compliance Challenges
18.1 Sarbanes-Oxley Act: ‘Adequate Control’?
The United States of America’s Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 [80] (also known
as the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investment Act) has im-
posed a number of obligations upon many firms in the United States. One
of the parts of the law often used within an IT context is Section 404. This
section requires that management establish and maintain “adequate inter-
nal control structure and procedures for financial reporting” and that duly
appointed external auditors assess the effectiveness of such controls and pro-
cedures [80, page 45].
However, it is worth noting that nowhere in the entire text of the Act
are there any specific requirements of ‘Information Security’, so this raises
the question as to what constitutes an ‘adequate control’. To this end, many
information technology and security firms have been eager to pursue new
lines of business and have actively marketed their product lines to organi-
sations seeking to ensure compliance with the legislation, much of it under
the mistaken notion that compliance can be achieved with a single product
[31].
One approach to looking at adequate control might be to start with an
understanding of the environment that is reflective of the organisation’s risks
(discovered by proper risk assessment), and then utilise best practice and
standards (e.g. ISO 17799) mapped to statutory/regulatory requirements
(e.g. PCI-DSS, HIPPA) to generate a security baseline from which the
organisation can build the necessary wrap-around policies and procedures to
ensure the quality of system configuration, application design, user platform
usage and ongoing administrative maintenance. It could be argued that
starting with a recognised secure approach to systems design, such as that
by the OpenBSD developers, is one of the first steps to defining a secure
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baseline on to which ‘adequate controls’ may be built.
18.2 Approaching Risk
Selecting a secure operating system, defining a suitable configuration and
deploying it within the enterprise should be seen as an action arising out
of a structured, planned and reasoned security assessment where failings
justify such actions. Mandating that all systems are configured to the high-
est possible standards, with extreme measures over change/release control,
management sign-off authority and least privilege enforcement may at a
high-level seem like the answer to security issues, but without a pragmatic
approach to assessing and managing risk, an organisation may spend more
money than is necessary, or even apply security controls to the wrong areas.
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Chapter 19
Open Source Software in
Business
19.1 Acceptance and Adoption
As with licensing, the rate and level of acceptance of open source software
is outside the scope of this project, but it is worth noting that in recent
years such solutions have been given a better opportunity to find their way
into organisations’ technology platforms. An example of this is the policy of
considering open source solutions issued by the UK Government - a policy
document issued by the Cabinet Office laid down instructions for Open
Source solutions to be given review where possible [5]. This driver towards
including Open Source solutions in evaluation against traditional commercial
closed-source solutions was one of the first steps in the UK to look at such
free software at a national level.
19.2 The Costs of Implementing Open Source Soft-
ware
Whilst free, open-source software such as OpenBSD may be free from licens-
ing costs, business still must pay for the hardware upon which such software
runs and the implementation and configuration costs for skilled personnel to
install and customise such software to achieve the necessary business func-
tions. Such costs are always unavoidable, as businesses must pay their staff,
purchase hardware upon which to run software and power the equipment
with non-free utilities such as electricity. As with any new software/hard-
ware project, there are also associated integration costs for staff to ensure
that new platforms can interoperate with existing enterprise systems. There
is also a strong likelihood that training will be required to educate staff on
the use of new systems, and this too is a cost which must be borne by an
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organisation.
A challenge for organisations is balancing the costs of implementing any
system against the business benefit, and it could well be that the cost of
training staff in a new operating platform may be in excess of paying the
licensing fees for commercial software with which they are already familiar.
It is up to management to ensure that an organisation’s information systems
strategy is aligned with the needs of the business, regulatory and statutory
obligations, and the security requirements necessary to operate effectively.
Open source software is not a magic tool through which organisations can
shed all their IT costs, but can be considered as an alternative to closed-
source, commercial solutions. Depending on an organisation’s appetite for
risks, all factors must be balanced.
19.3 Continuity and Source Escrow
Organisations may find that open-source software delivers an additional as-
surance by making the original application code available, giving the organ-
isation the freedom to hire their own programmers to perform maintenance
and functional extensions. Having access to the source code also removes
the necessity to arrange source escrow for applications (whereby proprietary
third-party code is held by a trusted entity in case of application vendor
bankruptcy, for example). Having the source code to software may also give
an organisation opportunities to quickly extend application and platform
functionality to meet new business objectives and respond to client needs.
However, this must also be balanced with the need to hire and/or train per-
sonnel to understand and extend the source code, and the costs of doing this
may outweigh the costs of having a third-party maintain code, especially for
applications with a low level of change. Contractors could be brought in to
maintain low-change code bases, but this also incurs costs and implications.
Financially Sensitive Environments may find that having the source code
to OpenBSD allows them to extend security functionality with organisa-
tional or departmental specific controls which better support their business
processes and align with existing audit procedures.
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Part IV
Case Study: Securing
Treasury
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Chapter 20
Background
20.1 Confidentiality and Context
For the purposes of commercial confidentiality, the following security assess-
ment has been sanitised of potentially identifying material including, but
not limited to, hostnames, IP addresses and office locations. For brevity
and clarity in keeping with the scope of this dissertation, sections pertaining
to physical security controls and treasury processes have been omitted. In
order to aid context for presentation of this assessment within this project,
additional sections have been added to explain the Treasury department
integration within the wider organisational network structure and the chal-
lenges it faces.
20.2 Overview
This case study is being included owing to the specific context of security
within a financially sensitive environment, in this instance a Treasury de-
partment. The assessment demonstrates areas which may be problematic
in such environments, and acts as a foundation for introducing real world
examples of where OpenBSD (and the security controls described in “Part II
- OpenBSD: Technologies and Features”) may be employed to address such
issues within the wider scope of managing information security for these
types of business unit. This case study will also show how some of issues
described in “Part III - Compliance, Financial Regulation and Control” map
to a real-world FSE and the potential security benefits afforded by place-
ment of OpenBSD into such an environment.
Conducted by the author during 2006, this assessment was undertaken
whilst acting as an information security consultant to a large international
financials firm. The scope of the security assessment was the electronic,
physical and process security of the Treasury department based in Berkshire.
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20.3 Security Assessment Drivers
The driver for conducting this security assessment arose from the Treasury
Manager’s concern that the technology deployed within her department was
dated and that the previously assigned dedicated technician had been made
redundant by senior management without her consent or knowledge, lead-
ing to a lack of maintenance in the environment. In addition, the upcoming
rollout of Windows XP Service Pack 2 across the rest of the enterprise had
not taken into consideration the enhanced security needs of the Treasury
department as neither the Treasury Manager nor any of her subordinates
had been consulted about their business requirements or concerns.
The question about security was raised at a quarterly review of the
EMEA auditing output and passed to the author whilst still under contract
with the organisation. Endorsed and authorised by the Chief Information
Security Officer, the security review was conducted with full knowledge of
all Treasury staff.
20.4 Outsourcing, Offshoring and Risk
During summer 2005, the organisation had decided that certain Treasury
functions would be off-shored to a team in Budapest. With the business
justification that the skills were available at a lower per-head cost than was
available within the United Kingdom, access to the main accounting systems
were to be gradually opened up to the Budapest team over a transition
period of 12-18 months. The Chief Information Security Officer advised the
author that the Treasury security profile had to accomodate the changes
in business operations and that subsequent recommendations and designs
must reflect the new working practice.
20.5 Treasury within the Wider Infrastructure
20.5.1 Segregation
The Treasury department was originally intended to be a secure compart-
mentalised section of the wider core network within the organisation, with
a firewall and strict policy to restrict network traffic between the “Treasury
Secure LAN” and other networks.
20.5.2 High Security?
In addition, the historical view of the Treasury department by both non-
technical Treasury staff and technical IT support teams was that the systems
were afforded a much greater degree of security than the rest of the corporate
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platform. As came to be discovered, this was not the case, and no documen-
tation or evidence could ever be produced by the technical teams to support
the original claims of hightened security controls ever having been put in
place on any Treasury server, workstation or network device.
20.6 Conducting the Security Assessment
After written authorisation was received from the Treasury Manager and
Chief Information Security Officer, and using the organisations information
security policies and standards documents, the security assessment was con-
ducted on-site at Treasury over ten working days, and included:
• Interviews with staff, including the Treasury Manager, IT Liaison and
Chief Cash Controller
• Network Security Assessment: Scan of “Secure Treasury LAN”
• Console-based investigation of system configuration
• Review of manual processes and procedures to establish existing prac-
tice and baseline context for electronic controls
An assessment was then produced, documenting issues identified and to
provide recommendations on remedial actions, advising short to medium
term compensating controls where appropriate in instances of significant
design issues.
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Chapter 21
Findings
21.1 Treasury Local Area Network
All internal company networks utilise private addressing as described in
[22]. The Treasury network has the dedicated network range of 10.252.16.0
with a subnet mask of 255.255.255.0 (a /24) allowing for a total of 254
usable IP addresses. The department consists of 35 workstation systems
and 5 dedicated servers, with servers being allocated static IP addresses
and workstations collecting a lease for an IP address via DHCP (Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol) [23]. The Checkpoint firewall gateway system
was assigned IP address 10.252.16.254, with all systems set to use that as
their default route to other networks.
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21.2 Server Configuration
All servers within the Treasury Secure LAN are running either Windows
NT4 Server or Windows Server 2000. No hardening has been performed on
these systems, and no system has had any vendor patches applied.
The detailed lists of Microsoft Windows services, file shares and enumer-
ated accounts discovered have been omitted for brevity, clarity and context.
One of the major problems identified in the Treasury Secure LAN was the
inappropriate configuration of the electronic payments system which feeds
the BACS clearing processor. This system takes an electronic transaction
file and sends it via a dedicated modem link to one of the payment banks
used by the organisation. This server collects payment information from a
variety of sources (including the Oracle Financials Server) and stores pay-
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ment instructions (including beneficiary names, bank account details, BIC
codes, currency and amounts). This plain text file is unencrypted, not digi-
tally signed and is located in a world readable and world writable file share
accessible to any system that can connect. Owing to the lack of any firewall
rules, any system within the organisations core network could connect to
this file share. The lack of any user or group permissions on this file and
share means that any person can modify the file, and no fraud would be
detected until at least 48 hours later when the bank reconciliation system
would download the statement files for cross-checking against the autho-
rised payments database. In addition, the system had no auditing enabled,
meaning that any modifications to the file would be anonymous and almost
impossible to track back to the origination point. It is worth noting that
the system is scheduled for replacement in the future, but neither project
plan nor timescales had been defined for the replacement at the time of the
security assessment.
21.3 User Authentication
All users within the organisation have their user accounts stored within a
Windows Active Directory, but the security assessment identified that the
current Human Resources policy and lack of systems administrators meant
that users who had left the company (for whatever reason) still had active
accounts within the central directory for anywhere up to 12 months from
the date of their leaving. In addition, no controls were in place other than
quarterly audit checks, and even these often failed to examine the entire
directory structure. At the time of writing, there are 47 Domain Adminis-
trators within the organisations domain, with sixteen of these accounts util-
ising generic usernames (such as ADMIN1), each with passwords commonly
known to many of the IT administration team. This lack of accountability
could cause a critical failure in security measures and exposes the entire
network to unauthorised modification and possible fraud.
21.4 Workstation Configuration
All workstations within the Treasury Secure LAN are running Windows
NT4 Workstation with Service Pack 6a. No hardening has been performed
on these systems, and no system has had any post-SP6a patches applied.
The detailed lists of Microsoft Windows services, file shares and enumer-
ated accounts discovered have been omitted for brevity, clarity and context.
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21.5 Time Synchronisation
All servers and user workstations within the Treasury Secure LAN displayed
incorrect times. No systems have been configured with NTP or Windows
Time Service to collect the correct time from an authorised time source. In
some cases the time on some systems was off by over 4 hours.
21.6 Outdated Operating System Software
Each user workstation was running an outdated version of an operating
system, in most cases this was Windows NT4Workstation, which is no longer
supported by Microsoft. This means that security fixes and critical patches
are no longer issued for this software, resulting in vulnerable systems which
can be exploited by attackers. All servers are also running either Microsoft
Windows NT4 Server or Microsoft Windows Server 2000.
21.7 Firewall
The Network team have advised that the firewall currently deployed to seg-
regate the Treasury Secure LAN is Checkpoint 4.1. Despite having been
deployed over four years prior, the firewall had not been configured, and
the filter rules were set to allow any traffic to any destination on any port,
resulting in a default permit and allowing any network traffic back and forth
between the core network and the Treasury Secure LAN. As there is no traf-
fic filtering or logging in place at all, the firewall itself is serving no security
purpose.
21.8 Internet Downloads
As with other departments within the organisation, the Treasury Depart-
ment is subject to web filtering to remove potentially hazardous downloads
such as known viruses. Web traffic is filtered by Bluecoat Web Proxy Sys-
tems, located within the organisation’s core network. However, the current
settings permit users to download executable content and other binary files,
which could contain unknown malicious software such as Trojan Horses or
spyware, potentially affecting the confidentiality, integrity and availability
of all systems.
21.9 Modems
A previous report filed by the XP Upgrade Rollout Team and the author’s
own on-site checks reveal that there are several systems in use within Trea-
sury which utilise Modems to connect to external providers and systems.
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Such devices are a major risk to corporate infrastructure as they bypass
network filter controls usually enforced by the boundary firewall device.
Whilst this security review did not check the individual security settings of
each modem, it is noted from the XP Rollout Team’s inventory documenta-
tion that in most circumstances the modems were configured with factory
defaults, and all modems permitted unauthenticated inbound calls to sys-
tems, which could allow unauthorised persons to gain access to the systems
to which they were attached, and if those systems were connected to the
organisation’s network, function as a beach-head from which additional at-
tacks could be generated.
21.10 Network Access Control
The Treasury Secure LAN has no additional controls to restrict unauthorised
systems from using its dedicated network. This means that any person
can connect a system (e.g. a rogue laptop) to the LAN and obtain an IP
Address via DHCP lease. Such a system can then freely communicate with
all workstations and hosts on that subnet. The lack of physical security
controls within the Treasury environment means that rogue systems could
be connected, and used to directly attack Treasury and the rest of the core
network - including the payment processing systems.
21.11 DNS Configuration
21.11.1 Overview
The following details pertain to the DNS servers which serve the whole
internal corporate network. All Treasury systems (workstations, servers
and network devices) utilise these DNS servers.
21.11.2 DNS Server 1 (Primary)
FQDN ukdns02.uk.example.com (PTR record for 168.76.149.8)
Hostname Ukdns02
Telnet Active Yes
Telnet Banner None, but version revealed as HP-UX B.11.11
SSH Active Yes
SSH Banner None
Version.Bind 8.1.2 (reported*)
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21.11.3 DNS Server 2 (Secondary)
FQDN ukdns03.uk.example.com (PTR record for 168.76.150.20)
Hostname ukdns03
Telnet Active Yes
Telnet Banner Yes, also version revealed as HP-UX B.11.00
SSH Active Yes
SSH Banner None
Version.Bind 9.2.0 (reported*)
21.11.4 Issues
The outsourced support team was consulted and the INITPRO UNIX Ad-
ministrator produced a document from November 2005 describing how the
two servers above were to be decommissioned in favour of the implementa-
tion of the new QIP IP and DNS Management system (administered by the
US Network Team). The two legacy DNS boxes were to be left running until
the QIP systems had stabilised and the pointers had been updated to reflect
the new DNS server addresses. These pointers still need to be updated in
the DHCP Lease settings on whatever QIP or Wintel box is running the
DHCP services as these old legacy DNS server addresses are still being re-
turned by the DHCP lease assignment to clients.
These two critical DNS servers are running on the internal core with
telnet access still enabled, plus all but one of the services are also not dis-
playing an appropriate legal warning banner on connection. There are also
multiple known Denial-of-Service and Unauthorised Code Execution vulner-
abilities in the BIND versions reported. If these two DNS servers were to
be disabled by poor configuration, exploit or denial-of-service attack then
it would disable DNS resolution for all staff workstations and other servers
that rely on them.
A more in-depth port scan of these DNS servers has not been conducted
as there is a high possibility of disrupting service. The issues discovered
with DNS do not affect just the Treasury department - as these servers are
located within the core network and used as the primary and secondary,
every single system which queries DNS via these two systems is potentially
open to flaws with either of these servers. An attacker who compromised
one or both of the DNS systems could modify the DNS server configuration
and “posion” the DNS database to redirect traffic to systems of his choosing,
or alternatively wipe out the DNS entries to perform an effective Denial of
Service on all systems which rely upon DNS.
* Reported Version Number discovered by:
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C:\nslookup
> set type=txt
> set class=chaos
> version.bind serveraddress
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Chapter 22
Recommendations
Below are some of the recommendations made to the organisation’s manage-
ment regarding remediation required in the Treasury department. Owing
to the poor levels of security present, it was recommended that the organ-
isation swiftly begin planning and design to work towards a fresh security
approach for Treasury, as can be seen in Chapter 23.
22.1 Network and Firewall
As stated in Section 20.5.2, personnel were under the misguided belief that
the Treasury network had been segregated from the rest of the core network
by a firewall with a restrictive policy to limit the systems and protocols which
could be used. It is recommended that this actually be put into place by
updating the firewall to the latest version, verify that the equipment is reg-
istered an as asset under the control of the network team (and supported by
the vendor as per organisational policy) and then configure a rule set which
accurately reflects the needs of the Treasury. Preferably the single Check-
point firewall should be replaced with a pair of OpenBSD systems running
pf and CARP (as described in section 5.2.5) which will provide resilience in
the event that a single system should fail - these should be configured in a
full mesh from the Treasury switches which will be provide continuity in the
event of the failure of one firewall, cable, switch or associated power supply.
The configuration of firewalls is not only supported by the organisations
information security policy, but is also recommended in “Section 11.4.5” of
ISO 17799:2005 [28] and “Requirement 1” in PCI-DSS [64]. To address the
staff ability to download potentially malicious binaries, a web proxy system
could be developed to vet all web browsing content, and prevent binaries
from being downloaded. Such a solution could be the use of an OpenBSD
server running the Squid Web Proxy. Alternatively, the existing Bluecoat
Web Proxy policy could be updated to restrict binary downloads, but this
would then affect the entire organisation and may have impact on areas of
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the business which require the ability to perform such downloads.
22.2 System Configuration and User Authentica-
tion
It is recommended that existing HP-UX systems be replaced with OpenBSD
servers running the business applications in emulated mode. This must first
start with a secure baseline (Hardened as described in Chapter 11 of this
document, and in line with the Global UNIX Security Standards), change
management process and oversight programme approved by the Global In-
formation Security Group. The business applications hosted on OpenBSD
servers will then benefit from Memory Protection Features (as described in
Chapter 8). In addition, each application should be assessed to ensure that
it is run in a restricted user context (i.e. not as root) and where possible,
constrained with Systrace (providing that a solution is found for the major
security flaw described in Section 7.3 of this project). Each server should
also be enabled with the pf firewall to limit administrative access to ap-
proved management workstations and also limit client access to only those
IP addresses with the Treasury Secure LAN - this will limit staff access to
the system. User credentials should be audited and linked with the core
Directory Services, possibly using Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP) extensions available for OpenBSD.
22.3 DNS
As described in 21.11, the issues with the DNS are not Treasury specific. It
is vital that these systems are patched (to remove the potential for exploiting
well-known flaws) and hardened against attack. At an absolute minimum,
Telnet must be disabled and only SSH used with public-key authentication,
as stipulated in the organisations UNIX security standards document. The
standard organisational legal warning banner must also be applied to the
SSH service configuration file. These two HP-UX DNS servers should be
replaced with two OpenBSD-based systems running the hardened version of
BIND which is present in the base system. In addition, pf firewall should
be configured on each of these systems to only allow DNS requests from the
approved core network, and rules can be put in place to limit connections
to the SSH port to the approved IT administrative workstations. This will
limit the ability of attackers to connect over anything except DNS, requiring
the discovery of a flaw in the OpenBSD BIND implementation, which also
runs as non-root restricted user. For additional security, the BIND service
could be run caged by systrace, although as discussed in 7.3 there are known
problems with systrace.
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Chapter 23
Designing a Secure Future
Treasury
23.1 The Challenge
Tactical remediation of the issues discovered by the security assessment is
the first step, but the question of its future security still must be answered.
23.2 Treasury Security Strategy
In the wake of the publication of the Treasury security assessment, the
organisation’s Global Information Security Group decided that a complete
overhaul of the way that security policy was managed and disseminated
was required. In addition, the author was requested to create a new secure
network for Treasury, addressing the issues identified in the assessment and
also providing a platform to ensure future security and adaptability for the
Treasury department.
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23.3 Technical Design
23.3.1 Network Diagram
23.3.2 Specification
The proposed future design for Treasury creates three separate network
zones. Segregation of these zones is by use of a stateful packet filtering fire-
wall (such as OpenBSD’s pf) to control traffic between each Treasury zone,
and between Treasury zones and the wider corporate network and external
networks such as the Internet. These zones can be created either on separate
physical switches, or by utilising VLAN technology on a single larger switch
whereby switching blades and their ports can be tagged for each zone. The
three network zones are physically cabled to firewalls, providing no direct
physical link between any zones apart from that mediated by the firewall.
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Treasury Secure LAN The zone in which Treasury users and their
peripheral devices are located. Minimal access
to this zone inbound from other Treasury zones
or any other network. No servers located here.
Treasury DMZ A new semi-public zone housing standard
applications, file servers and other server
-side functionality.
Treasury Payments DMZ A new Treasury-only zone housing the high-
sensitivity systems such as the Electronic
Funds Transfer (EFT) systems, and critical
file servers for processing financial data.
This zone can only be access by systems
located within the Treasury Secure LAN -
traffic from the Treasury DMZ, core network
or external networks will be permitted to
enter this zone.
A new baseline should be defined for a secure operating platform. Stan-
dard applications should be hosted on a server within either the Treasury
DMZ or Treasury Payments DMZ as appropriate, with client workstations
in the Treasury Secure LAN accessing necessary applications over thin-client
connections. This will remove the necessity to have (and maintain) full client
workstations in the Treasury Secure LAN, and result in minimal numbers of
ports having to be opened between zones. A technology such as Citrix could
be used to publish a working desktop to users, with separate servers pub-
lishing applications to the published desktop. A stripped-down desktop en-
vironment that only gives the users the applications they need would reduce
the risks associated with having to maintain other non-essential software,
and read-only client terminals would minimise disruption from potentially
malicious code. Published desktop servers can be hardened against attack
by removing extraneous software and drivers, and corporate branding and
settings can be placed at a single point of enforcement.
Infrastructure Server - OpenBSD system running BIND (DNS) to act as
a hardened DNS forwarder out to the wider core networks DNS server and
dhcpd (DHCP) to issue IP Address leases to systems within the Treasury
- this keeps infrastructure traffic from leaving the Treasury Secure LAN.
The system should be configured with a pf firewall ruleset to prohibit any
communication with the server other than DNS and DHCP requests, plus
administrative traffic from the approved IT administration subnet.
Firewall System - As described in Section 22.1, a pair of rack mounted
servers running OpenBSD to be locked in the Treasury’s dedicated server
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room. These servers to be running a minimal configuration of OpenBSD,
with pf and CARP to provide high availability firewall functionality. Rule
set to be configured to split out the various Treasury zones, with a port
on each firewall trunked to the appropriate VLAN or physical switch (as
budget allows).
A hardened log server (OpenBSD with syslog-ng/SSL) should be de-
ployed in the audit zone (with the core network) to receive logs from the
Treasury Zones. Any malicious intruder within the Treasury boundary of
trust would then have to compromise the physically separate (and secure)
audit zone in order to modify or delete logs of activities conducted within
the Treasury Zones. The syslog consolidation server will act as a central
point of collection for crucial audit data (as described in Chapter 9). The
use of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) to secure the syslog traffic addresses the
lack of security in syslog messages broadcast over UDP. This is an example
of where a third-party piece of software should be deployed, as OpenBSD’s
syslog implementation does not have SSL support (although some unofficial
patches exist to add this feature).
In addition, IPSec can be used between servers to provide mutual authen-
tication and also confidentiality and integrity to network traffic if ESP+AH
is used. In this respect, a malicious entity attaching a network sniffer to the
Zones (or modifying a network switch to re-direct all traffic to diagnostic-
s/mirror ports) would not be able to read or modify the network traffic. The
IPSec functionality could also be utilised to provide a secure tunnel between
the Treasury firewalls to the new Treasury team in Budapest (as discussed in
Section 20.4), which will create an encrypted channel between the Budapest
office and the Treasury site in Berkshire, UK. This means that a malicious
entity within the core network could not gain unauthorised access to the
sensitive content and/or modify it in transit. This could be deployed either
with another OpenBSD firewall in Budapest (creating a tunnel between the
two firewalls running IPSec) or alternatively a transport between each Bu-
dapest Treasury workstation and the Berkshire Treasury Firewall, effectively
providing the Budapest staff with a Virtual Private Network (VPN) between
Budapest staff and the UK Treasury.
All servers should be configured with host-based intrusion detection tools
(such as Tripwire, AIDE or mtree), regularly invoked by cron job or by dae-
mon timer to monitor changes to critical system binaries and configuration
files. Alerts relating to such changes should be directed to the organisation’s
information security e-mail address as a point of collection, so that the alerts
can be actioned by an appropriate member of staff and the incident response
procedures invoked. Such intrusion detection should detect if an attacker
had changed any system binaries (such as inserting a root kit) or added
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additional users with which to access the system, for example.
Provided that the Systrace vulnerability described in 7.3 can be recti-
fied, each server should be configured to constrain the business applications
present on the servers so that not only do they run as a restricted user ID,
but are also limited by policy as to which resources the application may
access and in what mode (e.g. file and network access).
OpenSSH (as described in Chapter 6) should be used on a dedicated
file server sited within the Treasury DMZ to act as a file transfer system,
removing the need for plain-text FTP exchanges in or out of the Treasury
environment. The use of the sftp-server subsystem can be bound to specific
users on the system to only permit such file transfers. This removes the in-
transit risks to payment data files being sent into Treasury from other global
branches’ AS/400 and IBM Mainframe systems. In addition, all systems
administration of UNIX systems (including OpenBSD) should be conducted
via SSH connections, and no Telnet daemons should be enabled on any
system.
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Part V
Conclusions and Looking to
the Future
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Chapter 24
Future Challenges in
Compliance
As new legislation and standards are introduced, there will be a growing
need to find effective ways of mapping those requirements to organisational
technology platforms. The business must not be hampered by the limitations
of technologies (or if they are, there must be sufficient tools to implement
compensating/mitigating controls) and the security, audit and compliance
functions within the enterprise must be able to understand the impact of
placing suitable controls in place, not only from a costs perspective but also
in aligning the needs of the business with overall organisational goals and
external obligations.
In Chapter 17, a basic mapping model was introduced to show how var-
ious controls from different standards and regulations could be aligned with
one another, and suitable functionality from OpenBSD brought in to meet
the needs of those areas. It is worth reiterating the issue of security di-
versity, explored in Chapter 14, and business leaders must have the right
information available to them as part of appropriate risk management to
ensure that security challenges are being met with the right type of tech-
nology, with the most suitable configuration balanced to the budget and
administrative overheads which are acceptable. Multiple layers of security
might be the best option for a business, but what populates those layers
should be a considered and reasoned solution.
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Chapter 25
OpenBSD’s Roadmap
Owing to the volunteer nature of open-source community software develop-
ment projects (such as OpenBSD) there is no real roadmap for development.
Developers work on the project in their spare time, and as such will be mo-
tivated to add features which interest them or are relevant to applications
which require certain controls to be put in place. The lack of such a roadmap
makes each release of OpenBSD interesting, as although one can follow the
CVS change logs or mailing lists, often many of the new features are only
very clear once various pieces of new code have been stitched together and
documented for release.
OpenBSD’s desire to be the optimal system for security features is now
being challenged by other operating systems, such as Sun Microsystems’
Solaris. Solaris is now freely available and contains many of the security
features previously reserved for Government clients (such as the Trusted So-
laris Extensions) [75]. Solaris has true Role Based Access Controls (RBAC),
something which OpenBSD currently lacks. With new developers joining the
OpenBSD team (and the Operating System’s profile being raised) there is
a strong possibility that additional functionality such as RBAC could be
added in the future. Such features could strengthen OpenBSD’s commercial
acceptance, and see its usage in Financially Sensitive Environments (and
indeed the rest of the enterprise) grow in the coming years.
OpenBSD has been in active development since 1997 and has shown no
signs of stopping, so with continued community support the features and
security of the operating system could continue to grow.
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Chapter 26
Conclusion
In “Part III - Compliance, Financial Regulation and Control” we explored
some of the areas of statutory and regulatory compliance, as well as some of
the best practice and international standards control sets which are preva-
lent in today’s organisations. OpenBSD’s security features (described in
“Part II - OpenBSD: Technologies and Features”) map cleanly to many of
these control areas, and enable organisations to be able to meet requirements
and align their controls with their own business processes and functions. In
“Part IV - Case Study: Securing Treasury” we saw how OpenBSD could
be used in a real-world Treasury environment to provide enhanced secu-
rity for electronic payments systems and the nodes which feed them, using
a defence-in-depth approach of layering OpenBSD’s security controls with
organisational processes which support them. This project has explored a
number of security considerations and challenges in a Financially Sensitive
Environment, and the ways in which OpenBSD (and its security features)
might be applied to addresses such challenges and work towards the neces-
sary areas of compliance.
As demonstrated in “Part II - OpenBSD: Technologies and Features”,
OpenBSD has a number of security features, many of which are not present
in other operating systems. Additional controls such as memory protection,
system call policy enforcement and firewalling with pf have been investi-
gated and their attributes aligned with some of the security challenges faced
in business. In Chapter 5 we saw how the pf firewall is able to restrict
network traffic defined by policy, which gives organisations the ability to
control the traffic that enters or leaves their networks. As discussed, such
functionality is available in many systems and offerings, but pfs additional
features such as high-availability are available freely without having to pay
for commercial licences. In addition, the presence of transparent technolo-
gies such as memory protection, bounds checking/enforcing compilers and
systrace compilation all add additional layers of security to bring enhanced
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control to third-party or even emulated binaries.
I believe that the project objectives have been met, as the project has
discussed a number of main security features present within OpenBSD and
how they may be used to secure a Treasury environment. Over the course
of writing this report, a variety of new issues have been raised over not
just the security of OpenBSD, but how this can be realistically applied in a
business context, exploring the costs involved and the wider impact of im-
plementation, such as keeping policies current and the need for proper staff
training/awareness. For constraining applications, the features of systrace
have been tested with a worked example (Chapter 7) and have proven that
the system call policies are indeed effective. However, during the course of
that testing and writing of this report, a major new flaw was discovered (by
another security researcher) in the handling of system calls (Chapter 7.3)
which then raised interesting issues about the application of such system call
policy technology within the wider realm of enterprise risk management.
There are a number of books available on OpenBSD and its direct appli-
cation to areas such as firewalls, but I believe this is the first document to
focus on the challenges of using OpenBSD in a Financially Sensitive Envi-
ronment (FSE). This work has contributed the subject area of OpenBSD by
seeing how it can be applied in practice to an FSE, including how it maps
to some of the compliance and best practice controls which are commonly
required for such environments. The scope of this project and the time
available has permitted a focused discussion of only some of the security
controls against specific control contexts - I believe that there is sufficient
scope for far more detailed and expansive investigation into the applicability
of OpenBSD to Financially Sensitive Environments in future works.
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Appendix A
Abbreviations
BSD Berkeley Software Distribution
CARP Common Address Redundancy Protocol
CVS Concurrent Versioning System
DHCP Dynamic Host COnfiguration Protocol
DNS Domain Name Service
DSS Data Security Standard
FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name
FSE Financially Sensitive Environment
FTP File Transfer Protocol
FTPS FTP Secure (with SSL)
GPL GNU Public Licence
GPS Global Positioning System
IPSec Internet Protocol Security
ISC Internet Software Consortium
ISO International Standards Organisation
ITIL Information technology Infrastructure Library
LAN Local Area Network
NAT Network Address Translation
NTP Network Time Protocol
PCI Payment Card Industry
PoC Proof-of-Concept
QoS Quality of Service
RAID Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks
SCP Secure CoPy
SFTP Secure FTP (with SSH)
SSH Secure SHell
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
UDP User Datagram Protocol
WAN Wide Area Network
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